[Nettime-bold] Pierre Khalfa (ATTAC-France) on violence & the movement after Genoa

[patrice@xs4all.nl]

bwo the coorditrad (translaters pool)  of Attac.org, with thanks.

After Genoa, a few thoughts on violence and the current state of the 
movement .
Pierre Khalfa .

After Gothenburg, the Genoa demonstrations raised the issue of the 
relationship with violence once again .

Capitalism, like all other systems based on one class's domination over 
the whole of society, was established using violence. It has built a 
system of domination that has used violence in different ways according 
to the period and circumstances: direct violence and attempts at finding 
a consensus to hide the system's oppressive brutality, each great social 
advance being won in more or less violent confrontation .

A tactical deadlock .

Historically, the decision to use or refuse violence to fight this system
on a daily basis has been determined by an overall "tactical" approach. 
It is therefore important to take a look at these disputes before 
re-examining the current situation .

>From the outset, the workers' movement was divided as to the kind of 
response it should give. Two main approaches appeared. One aimed at a 
gradual build-up of peaceful actions to gain positions of strength 
throughout society over time, thus coming to power and in this way 
imposing radical changes on the dominant classes. In this framework, 
violence could only be defensive, in the event of "bourgeois 
provocation", or as a final boost if the bourgeoisie could not admit 
defeat. The other approach was to say that, since the dominant classes 
had never given up the slightest iota of power without a fight, 
confrontation was inevitable - all the more so since the State apparatus 
was growing stronger each day, and they should therefore prepare both it 
and "the masses" consciously .

Neither of these approaches has worked. The first, applied in a sincere 
way, has led to tragedy - the most recent case being the Chile of Popular
Unity, or has mostly just been a pretext for accepting the system and
has  even been used to justify repressing the most radical forces. The
second  approach has also failed, ending in bloodshed, and its successes
were  short-lived. If the breakdown of the Russian, Chinese, Cuban, etc. 
revolutions cannot be explained by this single factor alone, their 
particular relationship with violence played a significant role. In 
addition, theorising violence, or even acclaiming it, has day-to-day 
consequences on people's behaviour and on the culture developed in the 
organisations that use it. It does not co-exist easily with open debate 
and setting up democratic processes .

Violence is not a neutral technical means. It has consequences on those 
who use it, on the society that promotes it and unavoidably dominates any
other social relationships. It is misguided to believe that it can be 
contained "elsewhere" and not affect those who use it. The idea that 
violence can only be used against the dominant classes is largely an 
illusion and "no violence in the workers' movement" has, historically, 
been nothing more than a pious hope. In the same way, the Maoist 
distinction between "contradictions among the people" which are supposed 
to be solved peacefully and "contradictions between the people and its 
enemies", where violence could be used does not solve any problems: who 
decides who belongs to the people? Inevitably the use of violence against
the dominant has consequences on the dominated themselves and grows 
amongst them .

However, upholding non-violence does not solve our problems. Saying that 
you are non-violent does not mean that your opponents are too. The 
Gandhian non-violence experience met with numerous massacres by the 
British Army and did not prevent the Indians from killing each other 
subsequently. In addition, everyone knows that many peaceful 
demonstrations have been and still are subject to government repression, 
Genoa being the most recent example .

This brief appraisal of the past brings us to the very heart of current 
problem. We must build up a new tactical outlook, and can only do this on
 the basis of the current state of movements and by taking onboard the 
debates of the past. We would be deluding ourselves to believe that 
capitalism would, without reacting violently, accept having measures 
imposed on it that radically question how it works. How can we prepare 
ourselves for this violence, how should we respond? Today there is no 
clear answer to these questions. This is the tactical deadlock that is 
complicating today's debates and making them hard to understand .

The current state of the movement as a starting point .

Since Seattle, the movement against neo-liberal globalisation has grown 
considerably. This has affected both the periodicity and extent of 
mobilisations and has brought increasing radicalisation, amongst the 
young in particular. But, and this is the main point, these mobilisations
are only the precursor of an overall shift in public opinion, at least
in  capitalistic developed countries. Not only are these movements
gaining in  strength, but they are also starting to resonate with the
concerns of  increasing segments of the population. The risk of a
recession, far from  undermining this shift, is speeding up awareness
(for the time being?),  as can be seen from the reaction to "stock-market
job cuts". This growing  echo to issues borne by the movement has put
governments on the ideological defensive and hastened the international 
institutions' legitimacy crisis, even if it has not made them change course at all. 

This ever-closer link with public opinion is the biggest danger for 
governments, the link they want to break .

This is the context, after Gothenburg, in which we must situate 
Berlusconi's attitude at the Genoa summit. Beyond the foul-ups that any 
police operation leads to, the Italian government (with the support of 
other governments?) chose to attack all members of the movement without 
distinction. In this way they could both criminalize the whole movement, 
with the hope of marginalizing it in the public eye, and divide its 
members in an attempt to integrate its most moderate supporters. It was 
not the Black Block's attitude that led to police violence, but a 
political choice made by the Italian government. Had the Black Block not 
been there, there is no doubt that the government would have found 
another pretext .

The visible nature of police provocation, however, and the very extent of
the repression had the opposite effect to that sought by the Italian 
government. The government's attitude was condemned by organisations 
which had not even called their members to Genoa and, far from 
marginalising the movement, amplified it. This strengthened its impact on
public opinion, and even more so when the Italian courts' first charges 
confirmed the idea of police provocation. The movement's strength led to 
a change in tone by most governments, forced to condemn police violence 
and to recognise that the problems raised by the demonstrators were 
legitimate, even if they do not seem willing to adopt the slightest 
concrete measure. In France, the Socialist Party (PS) is divided on this 
issue: MP Jean-Marie Bockel sees no common ground with Genoa 
demonstrators and is opposed to PS spokesperson Vincent Peillon and 
government MP Christian Paul, who support them (on the eve of the 
elections it is best not to alienate public opinion!). With the indirect 
consequence of the movement now carrying even more weight in public 
opinion .

Given this situation, we must at the same time fulfil 4 aims. Firstly we 
must maintain and strengthen the link with public opinion. Secondly we 
must avoid the movement breaking up. Thirdly we must be capable of 
assuming its increasingly radical nature. Finally we must continue to 
organise massive demonstrations to show its strength .

Fulfilling these aims necessarily means avoiding a certain number of 
stumbling blocks. Firstly we must avoid going to extremes as regards our 
choice of action that some might justify by governments' autism. This 
refusal is decisive if we do not want governments to win points in their 
attempt to destroy the public support we currently enjoy, whence our 
choice of non-violence. But at the same time this refusal must be 
accompanied by our taking charge of the increasing radicalisation of part
of the movement .

This means choosing forms of action that incorporate this radicalism 
symbolically. In the face of the system's violence, the choice of 
non-violence can be neither synonym to passiveness nor automatic 
acceptance of its legality, whence the "active" nature of our recourse to
non-violence .

The emergence over the last few years of radical non-violent forms of 
action taken by a number of social movements - unemployed people taking 
over French unemployment offices, or homeless people taking over empty 
accommodation, for example - has made it possible for those concerned to 
express their exasperation powerfully and give their cause visibility 
whilst at the same time having a positive impact on public opinion. We 
must take inspiration from this. The more we affirm the non-violent 
nature of our actions, the more we must present our determination through
the appropriate forms of action that must be discussed on a case-by-case
basis .

We must position our relationship with the Black Block within this 
framework. Even if it is not a structured group but rather a faction of 
varying dimensions, it represents the tactic of choosing systematic 
violent confrontation with the Police and the destruction of the "symbols
of capitalism" (bank branches, cars, etc.). This tactic is justified by 
"destroying property as a tactical means of direct action", by the aim of
creating "liberated autonomous zones" and by the need to waken a
sleeping  population by unmasking the repressive face of the State. We
must say  clearly that this tactic is not ours. It can bring only the
movement's  marginalisation and isolation and favours all types of
manipulation . However, it would be a mistake to reject this current as
alien to our  movement and consider it as simply a bunch of agitators.

Firstly because,  whether we like it or not, governments will assimilate
us with them and  our protestations will do nothing to change that...
other than make a  radical change to our forms of action by adapting to
what governments are  willing to accept. That kind of tactic would seal
the movement's break-up  and sign its death warrant. Secondly since this
faction may attract a  certain number of people who are sickened by the
system and who really  think that they can change things in that way.

Thirdly and, in particular, because any brutal rejection of this current can only 
lead to an even greater radicalisation which might lead to a Red-Brigade logic 
being implemented, which would be used by governments against all social 
movements. The experience of Germany and Italy at the end of 70s are 
illuminating on these points. Finally because their attitude can vary: it
was not the same in Washington (April, 2000) and in Quebec as in Genoa 
(possibly because the groups that bore the name were not the same). We 
are therefore at a watershed: we must both state clearly that the Black 
Block's methods and tactics are not ours, and at the same time not reject
them but initiate a political dialogue with them .

A few ideas .

The debate on forms of action, of which the use of violence is only part,
is running through the whole movement. We must assume and structure it
so  that it becomes a factor for political homogenisation. In this
context,  we must work on an international text on these questions that
could be  adopted after being debated by the various members of our
movement. This  reference text could be used as a charter for the various
movements and  include a number of concrete commitments .

In this context, we must discuss how our processions should be protected 
and ensure our right to demonstrate. We must be aware that the first and 
most effective protection is that provided by the movement's political 
force and its legitimacy in public opinion. However, this does not mean 
that we must underestimate the question. Although we must avoid any 
militarisation of our processions which, apart from giving an illusion of
effectiveness, would fudge our image, we must also be capable of
building  up a supportive framework sufficiently reassuring to enable
massive  participation in our initiatives by setting up a contingent with
a means  of defence .

Proposals are being made that aim to bridge the gap between the movement 
and the Institutions. French Green Euro-MP Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Le Monde, 
11th August, 2001) suggests a sort of compromise for demonstrations 
during the next European Union Summit. With the belief that this meeting 
has a democratic legitimacy that the G8 did not have, he proposes giving 
them the possibility of meeting together without any problems in exchange
for there being no red zones and there being a total freedom to 
demonstrate. A "demilitarised zone" would be created with no police, 
protected peacefully by 2000 "citizen leaders" (MPs, association leaders,
union leaders, etc.) .

This proposal acknowledges implicitly that summits are not all equally 
legitimate (whatever one might think of his statement on the EU's 
democratic legitimacy) and therefore that some are not justified. It 
questions the bunkerisation of these meetings and acknowledges the 
negative role of the Police. However, it does raise a number of problems.

Firstly, one might doubt that governments will accept the idea of a 
summit with no police protection or demonstrator-prohibited zones. There 
is therefore a great risk of these "citizen leaders" becoming police 
ancillaries to stop demonstrators entering the prohibited zone. 

Basically, this proposal aims at making us responsible for security at 
the meetings of institutions whose tactics we oppose. Is that our role? 

Moreover, who will decide on the legitimacy of such and such summit or 
institution? .

Beyond the action issue, we must expand our alternative suggestions. 

Today we have a number of limited suggestions. We must make them coherent
as a whole and in particular ensure that they are accepted by public 
opinion. This approach is all the more important in that the credibility 
of our actions will largely depend on these concerns, given that 
governments and international institutions want to confine us to the role
of "nice, pleasant people who pose real problems but have no real 
solutions" .

Finally, we must discuss rapidly the two significant events that are 
coming up : the WTO meeting in Qatar in November and the new EU Summit in
Laeken in Belgium in December .


August 2001 .
Translation by Amanda Brazier-Galbe



--  
Philippe Manet
sauf avis contraire dans le corps du message, pour votre s�curit�, 
n'ouvrez pas les pi�ces jointes !
For your security, never open an attachement unless clearly stated in the
mail !
Zu Ihrer Computersicherheit: �ffnen Sie keine Anlage, wenn diese nicht im
Anschreiben ausdr�cklich erw�hnt worden



_______________________________________________
Nettime-bold mailing list
Nettime-bold@nettime.org
http://www.nettime.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nettime-bold