Alex Foti on Tue, 30 Jun 2015 00:07:38 +0200 (CEST) |
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<nettime> With Friends Like These, the Precariat Can Be Revolutionary |
dear friends, what you think of this? it got bounced by jacobin. one of the editors had asked me to write about the precariat, but in the end they didn't like it. since in this piece i start to flesh out a theory of the precariat which is closer to what movements have in mind and hopefully more relevant than standing's (his merits notwithstanding) please tell me if you find it worthy of interest. best ciaos, lx With Friends Like These, the Precariat Can Be Revolutionary by Alex Foti, essayist and activist âThe Insurrection came but the Revolution did notâ What are we to make of the aftermath of 2011? Is the rebel fire spreading from Athens to Madrid, Tunis to Cairo, New York to Oakland, and more recently Frankfurt, Baltimore, Milan, harbinger of portentous transformation? In Europe, people who enjoy reading besides clashing with riot cops, are reading à nos amis, a modestly titled, albeit immodestly written essay on how to do the revolution now in the EU and all over the world, drawing from the experience (and the mistakes, Ãa va sans dire) of the failed revolutions of 2011. They started as popular insurrections, overthrew regimes, yet smashed neither State nor Capital, and didnât achieve fundamental transformation of social and economic relations, thus leaving room open to counter-revolution and regime restoration by reactionary forces in several countries. Coupat and his friends at Tarnac have produced a mind-blowing revolutionary treatise whose influence is unparalleled since the publication of Hardt&Negriâs Empire (2001), which in turn had a strong impact on the antiglobalization movement. The authors of the new radical manifesto, although steeped in Autonomous Marxism of the 1970s type, consider the latter and their followers as ideological adversaries, because of their willingness to deal and compromise with the official political sphere for radical ends. Those who previously wrote The Coming Insurrection, in Our Friends expand its scope from France to the whole world, but remain staunchly separatists from what they consider a fundamentally rotten capitalist society where mendacity and confusion rule. They argue (quite convincingly, I must say) that the Left is presently dead for all transformative purposes. The Social Democratic and Communist remnants that act in its name, in the west and elsewhere, are actually obstacles to the complete destruction of government power, because they depoliticize the masses with their repeated attempts to institutionalize social movements. In a vein similar to Naomi Klein, they argue that neoliberalism uses ecological catastrophe as a way to discipline society and impose hierarchy and inequality, so their thinking is both resolutely environmentalist (they inspired the ZAD, the eco-communal redoubt near Notre-Dame-des-Landes that lost a young activist, killed by police during a demo to block the airport project sponsored by French Socialists) and post-apocalyptic: the revolution is not here yet, but ecological and social disaster already is. The book is opened by an âACABâ graffiti, not to leave any doubts that the book stands squarely on the side of every street fighter across the planet. Every chapter is opened by a revolutionary graffiti on a wall of each of the countries touched by anti-authoritarian and/or anti-austerity insurrections (Greece, Turkey, France, Spain, Italy, Libya, Tunisia, Brazil, Mexico, the US etc) laying down the basic philosophical points the authors want to get across. In a nutshell, doing the revolution means to undo logistical power and break all illusions that society needs to be âgovernedâ. Since politics is the continuation of war by other means (the opposite of Clausewitz, but as Machiavelli would have agreed), Our Friends is far from seeing conflict, even internal conflict, as a sign of disharmony and failure, and military power as something not to shy away from in the pursuit of revolution. In fact, class struggle not only is the engine of history, but we feel happiest when in struggle, to quote Karl Marx. The movements of 2011 failed when they opted for process over action, for democratic assembly rather than revolutionary party, for liberal rights rather than communal counterpower (e.g. Tahrir, Plaza del Sol, Oaxaca, No TAV). Itâs Situationist and Anarcho-Communist, even if it sounds Leninist: there is widespread usage of ideological expressions such as the Party and the bourgeoisie, but the party is an invisible one and its ultimate aim is to disappear once government power is finally neutralized. For being a pretty good blueprint on how to start a revolution today (wisely, they refrain from detailing any kind of utopia, although they seem to have a fondness for a collective return to the age of childhood), Europeâs must-read political text lacks a fundamental dimension: the revolutionary subject, as Toni Negri, Mario Tronti, and all of operaismo remind us. They actually argue it is a particular historical situation that makes men and women revolutionary, rather than political activism or ideological indoctrination, but they are singularly blind to the two points that all 2011 revolutions had in common: they expressed the right to the city as they seized the main squares of political and financial capitals around the world, and, most importantly, they were all activated by disenfranchised young people. The revolutionaries have been unemployed banlieusards and indebted educated youth sharing the same condition of social and existential precariousness: in a sentence, the revolution was made by the precarious generation. Furthermore, radicalized precarious youth were critical in giving the movement its dynamic, open-ended character, and its lively and popular communication style, attracting increasingly larger sections of mainstream society into its orbit. Thus, the point I want to make here is that the precariat is the revolutionary subject, the social actor that will be the gravedigger of neoliberalism before it kills us all. In fact, to use the style of old leftist propaganda: the precariat is the class that will overthrow neoliberal oligarchy and destroy digital oligopoly. The rise of precarity: a society of permatemps In the 1990s and 2000s, precarious labor spread to all industries and industrial nations, as a whole string of generations (X, Y, Z) fell for the allure of employment flexibility and into the pitfall of income insecurity. As productivity grew remorselessly through digitization and automation, profits surged for a handful of digital companies and financial corporations, while precarization kept wages in check, causing the share of capital on income to rise and the share of labor to decrease in a dramatic fashion with respect to the Fordist past, as Piketty has shown. In other words, precarity is the true driver of inequality. The precarity of labor shows in the data. Using a narrow definition of precarity â someone having a short-term job â we see that the share of temporary employment has climbed to about 15% of the total working population (2012, OECD data) in North America, France, and Germany. In Europe a quarter of the people aged 15-39 in dependent employment presently work precarious jobs, and in Southern Europe, the share is usually higher, not counting huge youth unemployment, affecting around 40% of young people in Italy, 50% in Spain and Portugal, 60% in Greece. Considering that 15% of European employees work under short-term contracts and that their total number is over 115,000,000 (early 2013 data from Eurostat), we can estimate there are at least 17 million precarious workers in the Eurozone. Most are permatemps, and have been working short-term jobs for years. The emergence of a precarious population is particularly striking amongst new hires. As of 2013, in France 83% of new jobs were short-term, two thirds were positions lasting less than one month, and the number of temps reached a record-breaking 4.4 million, up from 2.5 million in 2000. In the same year, the US Department of Labor reported the country had more temporary workers hired through temp agencies than ever: 2.7 million. Nearly 20 percent of US employees work part-time, with 7.5 million of them underemployed, forced to work shorter hours despite a preference for more hours. As the latest ILO report confirms, precarization of the labor force has increased since the Great Recession, while precarious workers and households have grown poorer. In Europe, between two-thirds and three-fourths of all jobs created since the Great Recession are precarious and insecure. According to the OECD, the 2001-2011 decade saw the incidence of precarious work growing for the most active sections of the labor force. At the end of the decade, it affected 27% of German employees under 40; for France, the proportion was 23%; for Italy 20%. In the Peninsula, the rise in youth precarity has been particularly dramatic: one in two young workers are precarious. In fact, in 2001, less than 25% of employees under 25 had precarious jobs, while in 2011, the percentage had risen to nearly 50%, more than 53% in the case of young women. France (55%) and Germany (56%) also have more than half of their youth in precarious jobs. Spain has the record share of young people affected by labor precarity (more than 60% of workers under 25). These four countries are also those where the movement discourse on precarity emerged in the early 2000s. As the latest ILO report confirms, precarization of the labor force has further increased since the Great Recession, while precarious workers and households have grown poorer. In Europe, between two-thirds and three-fourths of the jobs created since the Great Recession are precarious and insecure. In fact, at each recession since the onset of neoliberalism in the late 1970s, temporary, part-time, and free-lance employment has expanded inexorably to give life to a new social class, the precariat, which is different from the old working class, with its social-democratic unions and parties, and the old middle class, with its liberal associations and democratic parties. Contrary to what Guy Standing (the precariat is the sum of all those at risk of job insecurity) and Andrew Ross (the precariat is the sum of service labor in the North and informal labor in the South) argue, in the view of the EuroMayDay organizers and SanPrecario creators, including myself, the precariat contains all the younger generations living under advanced capitalism who are working as temps, interns, part-timers, as free-lancers and contractors, and all of the jobless youth, either because they are unemployed (temporarily or not) or have decided to stay out of the workforce altogether (NEETs). Here comes the One Big Precariat So the precariat is the sum of people working precarious jobs in dependent employment and formally independent employment, as well as experiencing unemployment. We can distinguish a service precariat (viz. the successful minimum wage campaign âFight for $15â initiated by fast food workers) and a knowledge precariat (the GESO struggle in Ivy League universities in the mid-90s, for instance), but whatâs important is to recognize the emergence of the precariat as a class in itself (or in the making, as Standing argues), a class that is in the process of becoming a class for itself through the social mobilization occurring against austerity and inequality. At the risk of caricaturing, Ford is to Walmart what the industrial proletariat is to the service precariat. The precariat is a recombinant class made by children of wage- and salary-earners shut out of meaningful social and professional advancement. The precarious are todayâs equivalent of plebeans and proletarians. They are the class that nobody wanted to name because it was a condition lived in shame. Now that temps are the norm, and perms the exception, the time has come to acknowledge the makers of contemporary digital and financial wealth. Indeed, the precarious are the ones having children and reproducing society, at decreasing rates since the cost of housing and daycare has gone to the roof. They have nothing but shall be all. Precarity is both exploitation and liberation. It deprives young workers out of their labor and welfare rights, but leaves them uncommitted to the work ethic and discipline of their forebears. Precarious people express themselves outside work, establishing communities of scope and support. But with the crisis the exploitative element in flexible jobs is increasingly apparent: the precariat must flex its muscle and fight for its rights, for it has interests that are at odds with those of traditional blue and white collars. Fundamentally, the Left sees the precarious as lacking a fundamental quality to make them full-fledged workers and citizens: steady employment. Precarity is thus perceived as a lack thereof, rather than as a new condition that calls for new types of organization and conflict. Unions have been slow in organizing service labor, because itâs the province of young people, single mothers, minorities and immigrants, while unionism has been conceived as a white working-class affair since its 19th century origins. No matter, for the precarious have bypassed unions and parties and gone straight to the heart of the state, by being at the vanguard in the barricades and acampadas that have rocked the world since 2011. In fact, it is hard to explain the success of Podemos in European and local voting, and the election of squatter and housing rights activist Ada Colau as mayor of Barcelona (two in her staff are former EuroMayDay organizers:), without their continuous reference to the problems created by labor precarity and the financial abuse committed by the âcasteâ, in a crisis that has caused mass evictions and mass youth unemployment. Spain is a country where one in four workers is precarious, and half of the countryâs young are unemployed. Indeed, the near totality of the political cadres of Podemos, as well as the activists behind the urban coalitions achieving success in Barcelona and Madrid, belong to the precarious generation. Precarious politics: reform or r/evolution? Podemosâ dazzling growth in Spain poses the problem whether the precariat should veer toward reformist populism and âOccupy the Stateâ, to quote the sociologist Paolo Gerbaudo, or toward revolution, as Our Friends forcefully argues, and âSmash the Stateâ. Some would also include in the debate the hopes raised by Syrizaâs electoral boom and accession to government in Greece, although the latter is a more traditional federation of leftist parties, very similar to Izquierda Unida that Podemos run against and squarely defeated, before challenging successfully the Popular/Socialist duopoly on power, and particularly the conservative PP, the staunchly Catholic and pro-austerity party of the current prime minister, many of his parties colleagues being tried for financial fraud. The issue of European revolution poses itself today in a way similar to the debate that opposed Marx and Bakunin during the First International. Faced with the failure of the 1848 revolutions, the two giants of communism and anarchism battled over whether a united Europe should be born out of a transnational federation of revolutionary communal entities (anarchists), or as a confederation of socialist nation-states, each previously conquered by a revolution led by the party of the proletariat (marxists). Itâs interesting to note that both considered some sort of United States of Europe the final outcome of their very different revolutionary projects. Today, the precariat is split over the following issue: should it seize power in one nation-state and bargain with the forces of austerity commanding the EU, like Syriza has done in Greece and Podemos seeks to do in Spain, or should it build a trans-European anticapitalist movement against the Troika that is capable of overthrowing the eurocracy, as (Black) Blockupy has tried to stage in Frankfurt against the European Central Bank in March, with Europeâs anarchoautonomous networks extending into the MayDay demo in Milan, characterized this year by NoExpo riots in the wealthy areas near the city center, making the news headlines, and triggering internal debate, as well as a moral-majority style reaction in the city and the rest of the county against âirrational violenceâ. Since 2001, the MayDay Parade in Milano has acted as a rallying point for a whole generation affected by precarity to fight for new rights and forms of solidarity on and off the job: students, immigrants, queers, ravers, temps, part-timers, social centers, radical unions, autonomists, anarchists, and all kinds of creative teams and ecologist collectives have given life to a spontaneous celebration of what has become Italyâs (and to some extent Europeâs) Precarious Workersâ Day. Participants have been in the tens of thousands since the mid-2000s. Each year a different theme links all the various wagons and trucks that bring the parade and its carnival of revolution to life. Last year it was against Renziâs Jobs Act, this year it was about the encroachment of free labor in young peopleâs lives, and against Expo Milano 2015, the World Fair crewed by voluntary and temporary labor, which was decreed would open on May Day (it ends on Halloween). Italyâs politicized precariat, which had organized a successful national strike (#scioperosociale) in the fall, saw this as a major affront, and for the first time in over a decade, the parade was not peaceful. Thousands threw bottles, rocks and firecrackers at the riot police and carabinieri, a barricade was set alight, and two dozens of luxury cars where torched in the area around Cadorna North Station, where the rich Milanese live. The nominally leftie mayor rode bourgeois outrage and spearheaded a petty bourgeois reaction to the actions of MayDay demonstrators, by leading a counterdemonstration to erase all political writings from city walls on May 2. Surely, it takes more than a May Day riot in Oakland, Montreal, Milan or Istanbul to start a revolution, but no revolution was ever done without rioting. Non-violence is successful at reforming the State, not at overthrowing it. Street clashes and property damage are communication acts that bespeak of the existence of an angry and young social opposition to oligarchy. However, as Our Friends argue, a hooligan can be the obverse of a pacifist: being always right, sticking to oneâs principles, means also being always wrong, in the sense that making violence/nonviolence a strategy rather than a tactic is bound to play in the hands of the adversary. So what does the precariat need to overcome neoliberalism: reform or revolution? Looking at the lesson of the Great Depression and its successful fight against inequality through labor conflict and social regulation, one would argue in favor of the former, for nefarious nationalist forces are waiting in the wings of declining liberalism, just as they did in the 1930s and 1940s. However, one could argue that capitalist civilization is so financially and morally bankrupt that only revolution can protect the socialization of rights and resource, and defeat European fascism and Sunni salafism. In Europe, it feels like all venues for political reform are closed, no matter what is done at the national level. If movements do not bring the conflict to Brussels and lay siege to the European Council, and its executive arm, the European Commission, I fear no political victory in individual European nation-states will amount to much change in the way the European Union is governed. In Europe, a reformist strategy would be to apply so much political pressure from below that EU governance is altered, particularly in its anti-social monetary and financial arrangements. Conversely, a revolutionary strategy would entail seizing the European Parliament and turning into a counterpower against Council and Commission. For that you need the equivalent of a European Self-Defense Force, which would be some kind of transgender volunteer army ready to fight in the name of freedom, equality, ecology. It would start to recruit and operate publicly once the first European city has been liberated, so itâs not a bunch of secretive comrades plotting assassinations like RAF or the Red Brigades did back in the days, but a militia-like organization like the Black Panthers or the International Brigades in their eras. If that sounds crazy (and it is), look at what ISIS has achieved through militant recruiting in the service of eschatological reaction, or, conversely, what YPJ and YPG have managed to do in Kobane on the opposite side of the political spectrum, by inflicting the only serious defeat Daesh has suffered so far, in the name of a non-sectarian, non-misogynistic, egalitarian political worldview. A European civil war is unlikely at the moment, but the scenario could change if strongly nativist forces (usually bankrolled by Putin) get to rule major countries in the EU, particularly, but not exclusively, France (Italy is also in danger), and Merkel finally wrecks the Union to teach a lesson to Greece and Southern Europe on the euro's unreformability. Anti-immigration hysteria would then be given free rein and create political tensions difficult to imagine (for a paradoxical scenario, read Houellebecqâs latest novel). The precariat is inherently multi-ethnic and will have to face down the mortal threat posed by xenophobic movements if these take power. Presently, the socialist-christian-liberal EU fortress is threatened from all sides, as migrants drown by the thousands in the Mediterranean sea, and anti-European racist parties are on the rise everywhere. If the euro collapsed and the European Union disintegrated, nobody knows what could happen. Ukraine already means the threat of war for Europeans, and Russia is on the wrong side. Today, nationalism threatens Europe externally and internally. Rabid nationalism plunged Europe in two world wars, today it could cause a civil war opposing Christian Europe to Mongrel Europe. If the EU collapsed on Greece and migrant, it's likely that the precarious will have to take sides: revolution or reaction. But for now, a united populist front led by the precariat against oligarchy seems the best bet to shelve neoliberalism and reform capitalism. Until the next major crisis. Not that our friends would agree. # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected]