Re: <nettime> âGreece Brought a Latte to a

["t byfield" <tbyfield@panix.com>]

Felix, I think you're too pessimistic. Greece faced a long, dark tunnel 
before Tsipras became PM, and they face one now -- maybe on worse 
objective terms than before, as many think. In the short time Syriza has 
led Greece, the nation's economy has deteriorated seriously. Tsipras is 
compromised now, will lose the momentum that was fueled by a succession 
of dramas and showdowns, and his coalition is more fractious than ever. 
Even if he can get the agreed-upon reforms approved by parliament, it 
remains to be seen whether that will translate into effective 
implementation -- so it's lose-lose, right? If they do implement them, 
the Greek people will suffer; if they don't the Greek people will 
suffer. The most likely outcome is that they'll half-implement them, and 
that it will be a continuing basis for the lenders to argue, stall, 
demand additional concessions, biding their time until the government 
collapses.

But: Greece has shown, conclusively and for all the world to say and 
*say openly*, that the European project is directly opposed to 
democracy; that it's dominated by Germany; that Germany's political 
structure is dominated by its financial sector; and that its financial 
sector is dominated by a clique of sadistic fools.

That's hardly a positive political ideal or end in itself, obviously -- 
and it isn't even much of a silver lining. But wider recognition of this 
is an immense change. But I don't think its 'soft' long-term impact 
should be underestimated. Certainly in Greece, 'Europe' will never be 
the same again. The dominant paradigm has been to see Greece as 
historically 'behind' most of Europe in terms of progressive 
developments. But the Greek people have exposed that historical 
narrative and have introduced another -- one in which their hard-won 
political understanding of the European project is very *advanced*. That 
seems vague to the point of vaporous, I know, but so did local variants 
of communism in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland -- which 
turned out to be decisive. (I'm not forgetting all our friends in 
Romania, Bulgaria, etc.)

I suppose Tsipras and Varoufakis can be criticized for the divide 
between their words and their actions -- in particular, for playing 
chicken with a Grexit but without preparing. But how exactly could they 
have prepared? Should they have worked with currency manufacturers like 
Giesecke & Devrient (based in Munich) or De La Rue (based in England)? 
Any practical preparations would have been exploited as a step toward 
one of the same outcomes.

Cheers,
T

On 13 Jul 2015, at 6:02, Felix Stalder wrote:

> [So, Greece caved, it signed up to what even the German media called
> "A list of cruelties" and "an offer designed to be refused". So why
> didn't they go for an Grexit?
>
> Basically, because they never prepared for one, and doing an
> unprepared currency switch would have led to the immediate collapse of
> the economy and, and given how dependent the country is on the import
> of food, medicine and energy, to a collapse of society. In order
> words, while Varafoukis talked about being willing to blow things up,
> they did not prepare for it at all, and thus had no choice than
> becoming the warning example of what it means not to toe the German
> line. Form a purely short-term humanitarian view, and given the hand
> they have been dealt (and dealt themselves), it was probably the right
> thing to do. What it's unlikely to solve any problems in the medium or
> long term. But for now, it's a long dark tunnel, not just for the
> Greeks. Felix]


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