Re: <nettime> rage against the machine

[Morlock Elloi <morlockelloi@gmail.com>]

The below is a grim read, and shows what happens when imponderable 
complexity performs very ponderable mass murder. Unlike red-herringing 
here on nettime, it was a very physical fight between humans and 
machines, which humans lost due to limits of muscle power.

Next time someone tries to abstract the murder into some bullshit 
complexity, re-read from the below:

'''Manual trimming means using banal muscle power, insiders call this 
work even "acrobatic". Probably that is why the affected airline 
Ethiopian Airlines in their communication this week, it is very 
unfortunate that the pilots of the crash machine "despite their hard 
work" could not prevent the aircraft to continue the deadly course.'''

They probably died swearing. They knew that it was the machine killing 
them. I wonder if they died screaming at the machine or at its designers?


Machine translated from 
https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Absturz-ET-302-Minuten-des-Schreckens-4365546.html

Preliminary investigation report from Addis Ababa relieves the pilots 
after the second crash of a Boeing 737 Max - and provides dramatic 
insights, at the same time, the question of the relationship between man 
and computer comes to a head

On a dry field a few miles outside the Ethiopian town of Bischoftu, 
flight ET 302 ends on Sunday morning, March 10, at 8:45 am in a 
fireball. For 149 passengers and eight crew members from 33 nations, it 
meant death. Several meters deep, the soil is torn open, the earth 
burned black. A short flight of terrifying moments: The Boeing 737 MAX 8 
machine was barely seven minutes in the air after it had just left the 
Bole Airport of the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa.

The pilots flew according to the standards

Now, just over a month later, a preliminary report is available. The 
report was eagerly awaited as the circumstances surrounding Flight ET 
302 continue to raise pressing questions. The aircraft's control 
software was soon suspected, as in a crash a few months earlier, in 
which a Lion-Air machine of the same type (also a Boeing 737 Max) 
crashed in Indonesia. This killed 189 people.

Whether the controversial control system of the model family for the 
calamities ultimately alone (or in which constellation) was decisive, 
must be further clarified in the details.  However, the preliminary 
investigation report from Addis Ababa, which the Ethiopian Minister of 
Transport Dagmawit Moges presented to the public at the end of the week, 
provides some information that could help to educate.

For example, the crew of Ethiopian Airlines acted correctly in the 
minutes before the crash and complied with all requirements set by the 
manufacturer Boeing for the critical flight phase. Occasionally even the 
qualification of the crew had been questioned. At first, the pilots were 
acting professionally according to the checklist "Stabilizer Trim 
Runaway" and switched off the electric trim. Nevertheless, you can not 
bring the machine under control. The course of the flight remained 
unstable. According to the research from Addis Ababa, there is no doubt 
that the nose of the machine has been pushed down automatically several 
times without appropriate instructions.

Deadly fiasco

In vain did the crew of the 737 fight to stabilize the situation. Three 
times the captain called to his co-pilot "Pull up!", But it did not 
help. The data from the flight recorder of ET 302 clearly shows that the 
pilots repeatedly switched the automatic control on and off. They 
followed the instructions. The on-board computer stubbornly took over 
and kept the direction, pulling the nose of the aircraft down again and 
again. Enormous forces must have been created, possibly in connection 
with an unusual acceleration - forces that had a dramatic effect on the 
course of the flight and worsened the situation.


Is that why obvious attempts to trim by handwheel failed?  Such manual 
interventions are part of the pilots' flight repertoire - and they are 
usually associated with considerable effort. Manual trimming means using 
banal muscle power, insiders call this work even "acrobatic". Probably 
that is why the affected airline Ethiopian Airlines in their 
communication this week, it is very unfortunate that the pilots of the 
crash machine "despite their hard work" could not prevent the aircraft 
to continue the deadly course.

However, the question also remains after these considerations ultimately 
not answered, why the juggernaut did not continue consistently manually. 
If the electric motors for trim adjustment are disconnected from the 
power supply, the autopilot can actually no longer provide any inputs. 
Did the pilots of ET 302 come up with the right approach, but - under 
enormous stress - changed the "course of action" too hectic and thus 
enabled further trim inputs of a faulty system?

More software problems - rival Airbus rethinks security architecture

While the crew is relieved to a certain extent by the preliminary 
investigation report from Addis Ababa, the pressure on Boeing is getting 
bigger and bigger. After two crashes with a total of 346 victims, the 
controversial control software MCAS should actually be modified quickly, 
but you came across recently on a second software problem. This was 
stated in the revision of the controversial control program, but is not 
directly related, Boeing said.

The competent aviation authority FAA, however, classifies the problem as 
safety-relevant. The FAA had previously been under pressure, alleging 
that the US agency had turned a blind eye to certification of the 737 Max.

 Meanwhile, the European company Airbus seems to learn from the 
mistakes of its US competitors. A computer update is being made for the 
A320 family to help do the right thing in complex moments and under 
pressure. This reflects a rethinking of the security architecture that 
has become essential and simultaneously a problem in a modern aviator. 
Warnings, alert priorities and procedures should be designed to ensure 
that pilots can quickly and correctly diagnose the source of erroneous 
information.

Behind this is the realization that in modern aircraft with multiple 
interacting systems, too many levels exist between the source 
information and the pilots - a complexity that poses potentially deadly 
dangers.

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