| Phil Agre on Sat, 28 Mar 1998 00:43:35 +0100 (MET) |
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[I have enclosed Dave Crocker's reply to Gordon Cook, along with the comments on domain naming that Tony Rutkowski submitted to the NTIA. I have taken the liberty of reformatting both messages to 70 columns. See also http://www.flywheel.com/ircw/gpsubmit.html ] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to [email protected] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 08:49:22 -0800 From: Dave Crocker <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Gordon Cook reply to EFF on domain names (My own comments submitted on the Green Paper are located at <http://www.brandenburg.com/misc/ntia-bburg.html>.) With respect to Gordon Cooks's note forcefully criticizing the EFF's evaluation of the US government's Green Paper on Internet administration, we see an excellent exemplar of the pattern that has tended to dominate this topic. As in any debate, an important requirement is to assess the competencies and goals of those taking the different sides. With respect to Internet administration, we tend to see those with significant, hands-on experience believing that the existing administrative authority (IANA) has and does work well, only needing continuing evolution to match changes in the Internet. Hence they believe that such evolution should be performed by and through IANA, rather than through US government intervention. Those making such comments usually have enough operations background to discern the considerable deficiencies in NSI's performance over the course of its contract and, therefore, consider it an excellent demonstration of the need to prevent for-profit registry (data base) administration. Claims that IANA has lost the confidence of the Internet community has no operational basis, since those administering the Internet continue to work under the authority and guidance of IANA. Concerning the detail of Gordon's comments: At 10:58 PM 3/24/98 -0800, Gordon Cook wrote: >Cook: Anyone who expends the intellectual effort to read the Green Paper >and various other filings should realize that this is a false statement. >NSI is having a permanent monopoly over nothing. If EFF means complain >that the US government will not expropriate the business that NSI built up In fact the GP does permit NSI to retain permanent, unregulated control over the com/net/org data base and to operate it on a for-profit basis. The idea that separating the data base operations into one part of the corporation and the front-end sales and service (competing) registrar function into another will somehow prevent NSI from using its special leverage sits somewhere between silly and absurd. The strongly dominant view is that data base operations need to rest in the hands of NOT-for-profit entities that are subject to meaningful public oversight. I should also note the rather strange view that NSI somehow "built up" its business. Yes, the rate of registrations grew, but is this really due to NSI? We need to remember that NSI did not create the business, did not fund it and did not market it. All they did was administer it under a US government contract and at the direction of IANA. The appeal of com/net/org is not predominantly the excellence (or lack) of NSI's administration but the fact that those top-level domains have the cachet of "global citizenship". I've seen billboards in Italy and Malaysia for companies using domain names from these gTLDs, yet the companies were clearly and only doing local business. NSI is in no way responsible for this phenomenon. It is part and parcel with the Internet's growth and its culture. >in .com - that is correct. But is NSI allows others to register into .com >that is in no way a permanent monopoly! Since this point is confused so frequently by so many, it is worth repeating the nature of the misunderstanding and the nature of the GP proposal. Registration can distinguish a front-end sales and service function, performed by a registrar, and a back-end, data-base registry function. For the Domain Name Service, the back-end registry function must be performed by a single entity, for each "level" in the DNS hierarchy. For each top-level domain name, there must be a single mechanism in charge of doing the actual data base updates, in order to ensure uniqueness and arbitrate competition. When those vying for names are competing in terms of business, the single mechanism must be a single, separate organization. In other words, competition among those doing the vying needs a neutral third-party to enforce fairness and ensure uniqueness. It is widely accepted that there can and should be multiple, competing registrars for the generic top-level domains. If one of the registrars has a special, inside track to the operator of the registry, they are certain to exploit it, since their goal is to maximize profits. The Green Paper permits exactly this unfortunate opportunity for NSI/SAIC. It permits the com/net/org registry to be owned and operated by the same corporate tree that will be a registrar for com/net/org. No amount of theoretical separation within the tree can guarantee fair treatment for the other registrars. The only way to ensure fairness is to establish the registry operations with an entity that has no ties to NSI/SAIC. The one exception to this requirement is if the entity has equal ties to all its registrars. An example of this is the Council of Registrars registry defined for the gTLD Memorandum of Understanding, which operates as a consortium of the registrars, and with public oversight from the POC (and PAB). >EFF: EFF believes that the National Science Foundation (NSF) made a mistake >by failing to control this for-profit company to protect the public >interest. > >Cook: Anyone who reads the public record will see that the NSF acted >perfectly properly. EFF had better make clear what its definition of the Quite the contrary. NSI has been operating without any meaningful oversight. Their charging scheme included a $15/year surcharge which is increasingly being viewed as an illegal tax. Further, the $35/year service fee is repeatedly evaluated as being between 5 and 35 times higher than necessary to recover operating costs. For registration renewal, the fee may be as much or more than 70 times too high. NSI claims otherwise, of course, but then NSI started doing this job when it had none of the relevant technical or operational skills and it has been learning as it has been developing. With respect to NSF, the error they made was in having a small, closed review process for the charging and the reviewing was done by people who also lacked the relevant technical and operational expertise. >extended to them in the future management of the domain name system. They >made a deliberate, intentional and ongoing attempt to steal from the public >the resource they had a five-year stewardship contract to manage and >protect. > >Cook: An absolutely outrageous statement�.especially the last sentence. Strong, yes, but not outrageous. NSI has claimed ownership over a data base it did not create and whose development and operation it did not fund. It has billing practises which include providing its customers with no verification or correlation of payment. It is known to double-bill with some regularity and to suspend entries erroneously with some regularity. It has a dispute policy which makes NSI an evaluator of the dispute and is widely acknowledged to be not simply unfair but astonishingly unfair. And so on... Independent of all of these historical negatives is the simple and compelling fact that for-profit control of a DNS top-level registry is entirely contrary to the best interests of Internet users. It will result in their being captive to the operator of the registry. As is the goal of all for-profit organizations, the registry will seek to maximize profits; control over the customer will permit doing that to excess. >Only the MOUvement, which I believe has now discredited itself in front of >a majority of Internet users, uses language designed to give Internet On the contrary, the list of supporting signatories continues to grow. One registrar has backed out, considerably after the USG government's intervention clouded the process and ensured substantial delays. (What is amazing to me is that only one has backed out.) The list of statements supporting the gTLD MoU, submitted in response to the Green Paper has been substantial. Best of all is the amount of material the Green Paper, itself, took from the gTLD MoU work, although of course it made no such attribution. >management to the contol of the International Telecommunication Union. But This ITU bogeyman is getting tiresome, since it has no foundation in fact. It has wonderful emotional appeal, given the ITU's unfortunate and unpleasant history with respect to the Internet, but relies entirely on old history. It is patently wrong with respect to current ITU history and it is patently wrong with respect to the nature and degree of ITU "power" over the gTLD MoU work. The ITU has been a highly constructive participant-among-equals in the gTLD MoU work. They have been playing the Internet game according to Internet rules. (And by the way, that's more than NSI can claim.) Further, the claim of ITU dominance is quite simply an insult to the many other people and organizations that have provided input, leadership and support for the gTLD MoU work. >Cook: Would it be too troublesome to ask EFF board members how they >propose to replace the infrastructure built up by NSI and legitimately >owned by NSI? Infrastructure capable of handling 50,000 help phone calls >per month and registering 120000 new .com domains. EFF is proposing action >here that if implemented would be disastrous for nearly 2 million current >.com registrants. Action that someone would have to pay for while This line of criticism suggests a deep misunderstanding of some fundamental points: First, let's again distinguish the sales/support registrar function from the registry data-base service. The 50,000 phone calls pertains to the former. The 120,000 registrations pertains to the latter. It turns out that the registration data base transaction rate is about 12 per minute. Modern transaction system can easily handle 100 per SECOND. In other words, the technology to perform the data base work is trivial, when developed by someone knowledgeable in that technology. The work done by Emergent, for CORE, is a prime example. Replacing such work costs money, but not an outrageous amount. Further we need to remember that NSI's investment was funded entirely by the US government and by its users. It made no independent investments, no matter how their bookkeeping might claim otherwise. With respect to the 50,000 customer calls, NSI is fully expected to be permitted to continue a as a registrar. If they are that good at customer support, their investment and responsiveness will prove to their advantage. >conveniently omitting to say who. Or has John Gilmore promised to foot the >bill? Besides not only do you need to have someone pay for it, it needs to CORE has already been footing the bill and has developed a system that is more efficient and more flexible and more powerful than the NSI system. It could fold in the com/net/org data base without breaking into a sweat. And please note that the CORE data base really WAS developed with private, speculative investment funds from the registrars, unlike NSI's source of public funding. >be up and working before one can claim it as an alternative. EFF could >have done its home work. It chose not to. A shame. Yes, not doing homework is indeed a shame... >EFF: We were happy to see that the DoC proposal requires Network Solutions >to give the U.S. government copies and documentation of all data, software ... >Cook: Shame on any organization that ostensibly is dedicated to the >preservation of civil liberties in cyberspace not recognizing the privacy >implications of what they are proposing. The irrational hatred of NSI >expressed by this document they remind me strongly of the views of John This sort of ad hominem attack serve only to miss the point that this data base is essential to the operation of the Internet infrastructure. The information which some claim is a matter of privacy is for Internet operations. The problems that ensue from misbehaving DNS servers, when there is no way to contact those responsible for the servers, has been long and well-documented. >EFF: Network Solutions should be required to turn over all root servers ... >Cook: Absurd. Also I believe that the assertion about the "difficulty of >changing the set of globally known root server addresses," is technically Well, let's see. First NSI has used their physical control over the A server as a political bargaining chit, in many private discussions about the DNS resolution. Second is a misunderstanding of the nature of the difficulty in moving the set of root server IP addresses. The physical aspects of changing the official list is easy. The operations aspects of instantiating that change throughout the Internet is problematic. It can be done but takes time. >EFF: Domain name registration and the generic top level domains themselves ... >Cook: Are you aware that you are asking for this to fall under ITU purview? >Are you aware of the incalculable dollar value of this to traditional >telcos which will be put out of business if they don't slow down the spread "Purview". Whatever this is supposed to mean, the facts are that ITU has no substantive control over this area. The concern over the telcos is even less relevant. >Cook: IANA's TSAR like implementation got us into this mess. It is not >the way out. Traditional bottom up self regulation as expressed in the >Open Root server coalition IS a solution compatible with Internet standards >and culture. Again, this suggests a basic lack of knowledge about the reality of IANA operational style, in particular the consultative nature of its decision processes. It further misunderstands the largely piratical methods of those who have pursued alternative root systems, under a continuing and impressive range of names, and with impressive organizational instability. d/ ________________________________________________________________________ Dave Crocker Brandenburg Consulting +1 408 246 8253 [email protected] 675 Spruce Drive (f) +1 408 249 6205 www.brandenburg.com Sunnyvale, CA 94086 USA [http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/130dftmail/03_23_98-5.htm] Date: 3/23/98 3:41pm From: Tony Rutkowski <[email protected]> Subject: Comments in Docket No. 980212036-8036-01 Karen Rose NTIA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Telecommunications and Information Administration Washington, DC 20230 Dear Ms. Rose, Please find below my comments in the above captioned proceeding. They are also attached as a Micosoft Word document. respectfully, /signed/ Anthony M. Rutkowski ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Before the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Telecommunications and Information Administration Washington, DC 20230 In the Matter of ) ) IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT ) Docket No. 980212036-8036-01 OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES ) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Comments of Anthony M. Rutkowski [signed] Anthony M. Rutkowski NGI Associates 13102 Weather Vane Way Herndon VA 20171 USA mailto: [email protected] Principal 23 Mar 1998 SUMMARY In general, the U.S. government in this matter is taking precisely the right course. It has instituted a lawful process domestically, sent the right messages internationally, and constructed an enduring, stable, open, industry-driven model and specifics for effecting these Internet-related administrative responsibilities. To the extent modifications are needed, it involves effecting a more diverse representative structure - especially involving Internet Service Providers and users - as well as avoiding the inclusion as of right by secondary groups. The proceeding and the associated "outreach" activities of U.S. government officials are responsible and commendable actions in the face of predatory, disinformative, and frequently abusive behavior on the part of parties that attempt to assert themselves as representing the "Internet community," as well as international organizations who seek inappropriately to assert their jurisdiction and involvement in the management of the millions of private networks, computer hosts and applications that share their resources through the Internet protocols. The steady reasoned course outlined in the NPRM will serve the Internet's development and growth - indeed the world - for decades to come. -------------------------------- break -------------------------------- Before the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Telecommunications and Information Administration Washington, DC 20230 In the Matter of ) ) IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT ) Docket No. 980212036-8036-01 OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES ) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Comments of Anthony M. Rutkowski 1. Anthony M. Rutkowski respectfully submits comments in this proceeding published at 63 Fed.Reg. 8825 (No. 34, Feb. 20, 1998). His expertise is well known to the agency - as an engineer-lawyer with more than 30 years experience and leadership in industry, government, and academic institutions, as well as author of scores of articles and numerous books. He is currently the principle in the consulting firm of NGI Associates with several Internet-related company clients - none of whom are directly affected by the outcome of this proceeding - and director of the Center for Next Generation Internet. He is also on the boards of Internet-related organizations and publications, but not speaking on their behalf. Full details are available at <www.ngi.org/rutkowski/>. --------------------------------------------------- PUBLIC TRUST MODELS ARE WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY PERNICIOUS FOR INTERNET IDENTIFIERS --------------------------------------------------- 2. At the outset, the subject matter of this NPRM deserves focus for what it is, and is not. The Internet by definition and in practice consists of millions of networks, computer hosts, and applications overwhelmingly in private hands that have autonomously provided for some degree of interconnection and sharing of those resources. It is this self-organizing agglomeration that we all casually refer to as the Internet. 3. There is a significant collective, general public interest in assuring the continued operation and development of the Internet and its applications. There is also a legacy role of the U.S. government that has been well portrayed in the NPRM, and an array of intellectual property and other legal issues. However, the identifiers associated with the Internet's operation are not limited like radio spectrum, nor are they used for the operation of public telecommunication networks. They are simply created, administered, and published for those operating and using the Internet. 4. Internet identifiers are therefore not "public" resources nor should they be part of a "public trust" model. Our systems of law domestically and internationally ascribe special meaning and effect to those terms that bring them under governmental and intergovernmental jurisdiction and made an inextricable part of many normative provisions. This is wholly inapposite here. Some parties - particularly intergovernmental ones - have sought to ascribe public resource and trust status to these identifiers. As the agency well knows, such a result has significant, far reaching, and uncontrollable effects that it has wisely eschewed. If it is necessary to create any kind of model, it should be a shared private trust. Explicit treatment of this matter in the subsequent Report and Order in the proceeding, and in diverse intergovernmental and bilateral forums will be necessary to effectively implement these policies internationally. I. The Proposal A. The Coordinated Functions --------------------------------------------------- THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INDUSTRY-ORIENTED CORPORATION TO MANAGE IANA FUNCTIONS IS WELL-CRAFTED, LONG NEEDED, AND PATENTLY APPROPRIATE --------------------------------------------------- 5. The creation of a new private-sector, industry-oriented corporation as proposed in the NPRM is precisely on target. The existing Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) arrangements in which a DOD research contractor and staff were tasked with these responsibilities has long been divorced from the reality of a huge commercial Internet infrastructure and marketplace. 6. The existing institutional arrangements and processes have been closed, with no due process or records, with significant conflicts of interest in evidence - yet remaining to be legally protected and funded by the U.S. government. This has unfortunately also contributed to an extensive period in which contract personnel, various non-profit organizations, and the intergovernmental organizations have sought to lay claim to these responsibilities and craft their own self-serving arrangements. --------------------------------------------------- SOME DETAILS OF SURROUNDING THE FORMATION OF THE NEW CORPORATION CREATE INAPPROPRIATE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OTHERWISE NEED ATTENTION --------------------------------------------------- 7. The staff and staff arrangements for the new corporation should be free from conflicts of interest that might give even the appearance of impropriety. The IANA function is presently provided for the U.S. Government under a significant sole-source contract to the University of California Information Sciences Institute; and the employees involved have direct, significant, and long-standing relationships with various of the parties whose interests are very much involved in decision making matters before the new corporation. Such a requirement is not only good policy for an industry organization, it will be a material requisite in minimizing subsequent litigation. 8. Although these ISI employees must necessarily be involved in any transition to new arrangements, the actual secretariat of the new corporation should either be outsourced by open, competitive bidding, or staff hired as part of open hiring process. Any newly employed contractor or staff should be not be affiliated in any way with present or future organizations whose interests are affected by matters before the new corporation. 9. Serious consideration should be given to creation of the new IANA organization as a congressionally chartered corporation. Doing so could provide additional stature and avoid any problems associated with the authority of the Dept. of Commerce in directing the creation of a corporation. Such action would need to be carefully described to make it plain that such incorporation is simply a ministerial act necessary under any jurisdiction, that the resulting corporation is a private international organization, and is not intended to serve any special U.S interests. 10. Further to the issue of operating as a private international organization, the established corporation in its charter should specify a requirement that the number of directors from any one country cannot exceed fifth percent. In addition, the organization should register with the Union of International Associations, effect relationships with other international organizations, maintain multilingual capabilities, and distribute the physical location of secretariat components. It should maintain especially strong, continuing communications with the national TLD registries world as well as the Internet operational organizations. 11. The NPRM appropriately notes the extraordinary and growing diversity of the "Internet community" so as to make the term essentially meaningless. Almost every organization that exists can probably find some argument why it should be represented in this IANA corporation. In addition, there is the problem of dealing with fronts. For example, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) is by no means "representative" of any Internet technical community. It is nothing more than an advisory committee of the small, highly-conflicted party in this proceeding - the Internet Society - which wholly maintains and controls the IAB to further the interests of the Society and its Board members in this matter. 12. On the other hand, there are Internet stakeholders who are to a significant degree affected by the NPRM and the ensuing activities of the Corporation. In pursuit of a objectives of the NPRM, if not legal sufficiency, the composition of the Board should be framed entirely in terms of stakeholder groups rather than organizational representatives. 13. The individual Board members should serve as individuals chosen by stakeholder groups, not as representatives of organizations per se. The NPRM attempts to identify some of those groups, specifically 1) the existing IP number registries, 2) the IAB, 3) a name registry association, 4) Internet users including non-commercial, not-for-profit use of the Internet, individual end users, commercial users, including trademark holders. 14. However, there are some glaring errors and omissions here. As noted above, the IAB exists simply as an Internet Society advisory committee. The existing IP number registries are administrative entities which are not themselves stakeholders. Conversely, the most directly relevant stakeholders are missing entirely, namely the several thousand Internet Service Providers. They are a large, diverse, and rapidly growing community that have little involvement or representation in older established Internet groups. Reference, for example, the attendees at any recent ISP Conference (ISPCON). 15. If the Board of the new corporation is to be truly representative of stakeholders - and thus minimize its risk of litigation - it will need to more effectively balanced. Annex 1 identifies these stakeholders, and is offered as a means of achieving better identification of groups and a balance in the composition of the board. 16. The NPRM objective of subjecting the new body to antitrust liability is commendable and a very important precedent in establishing a general model for future Internet-related industry activities. B. The Competitive Functions --------------------------------------------------- THE DIVERSIFIED REGISTRY-REGISTRAR MODEL IS APPROPRIATE - FOR ALL TOP LEVEL DOMAINS --------------------------------------------------- 17. The NPRM's proffered Registry-Registar model that allows for diverse imlementations is an approach that is both pragmatic and should balance the needs for both stability and greater competition at several levels. 18. The NPRM fails, however, to apply the model broadly enough. It should apply to all top level domains, not just the ones the so-called generic ones. Not only is there no reason not to apply the model to all TLDs, but failure to do so is patently discriminatory. 19. These policies established both through this proceeding, as well as the subsequent activities of the Corporation apply to the many private networks, host computers, and applications interoperating openly via the Internet Protocol - falling largely outside the normal jurisdiction or exercise of authority by national authorities. As noted above, these are private, not public, identifiers used in conjunction with private systems. In addition, these national TLDs can be readily conveyed by lease to anyone to be used for other purposes - as has already occurred in the case of the .IO domain. A private IANA corporation should not be exhibiting discriminatory treatment among any TLD groups. C. The Creation of New gTLDs --------------------------------------------------- A PRUDENT, EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH IS APPROPRIATE --------------------------------------------------- 20. The expansion of gTLDs at a deliberate and controlled pace is appropriate to allow for evaluation of the impact of the new gTLDs and well-reasoned evolution of the domain space. Although many parties have asserted there is a significant demand, it many in fact be minimal. Continuing experience suggests that the preponderance of U.S. domestic users prefer to find variants in the .COM or .ORG domains much more preferable than any other domains. Thus the real demand may in fact be far smaller than some have suggested. 21. On the other hand, given the self-organizing properties of the Internet, it seems unfeasible to control in any kind of absolute way, the emergence and use of new name systems. Parties of record such as Image OnLine, Iperdome, AlterNIC, AURSC have long maintained operational systems. Others such as InternetOne have leased national TLDs to provide new services. Still others such as CORE and pgMedia seek also to initiate services. All of these parties can provide useful, diverse testbeds, that hopefully can be managed and studied by the new Corporation - relying also on interested groups of experts such as the ORSC and any new bodies that will evolve. 22. Additionally, as the standards for new applications and systems begin to be used - such as the object models of the Open Management Group (OMG), or mobile autonomous agents of the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) - entirely new kinds of DNS approaches and ontologies will be necessary. Proceeding with flexibility and rapid adaptability cannot be underscored enough. D. The Trademark Dilemma --------------------------------------------------- THE TRADEMARK DILEMMA IS A MINOR FACTOR - PRIMARILY IN THE U.S. - AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM --------------------------------------------------- 23. Domain names are used primarily for corporate identification and branding in the United States. As the NPRM notes, remarkably few disputes have arisen, and these have overwhelmingly been solved among the parties, with litigation being very rarely necessary. Any new requirements or process relating to trademark disputes should be minimalist, and not encumber in any way the normal rapid issuance of domain names. Requiring registries to resolve disputes seems inherently ill-suited to their orientation and skill sets. 24. Because the vast preponderance of existing and future generic top level domain use is in the U.S. - and is likely to remain so - the construction of arrangements so as to maximize any resulting litigation in the U.S., seems highly desirable. The remarks of some commenting parties - particularly outside the U.S. - on this matter are especially disingenuous. In fact, the so-called generic TLDs have long been regarded as de facto U.S. domains, and eschewed in preference to national domains on a large scale throughout the world. 25. To call for complex and unnecessary global processes outside the U.S. to deal with what has primarily been a problem among U.S. parties, is little more than a calculated attempt to impede the rapid pace of Internet use and assimilation in the U.S. The general principles on these matters set forth in the NPRM - including the minimal procedures in Appendix 2 and the proposed study - are the right steps, and any new encumbrances should be weighed carefully. E. The Intellectual Infrastructure Fund --------------------------------------------------- RECENT DECISIONS HAVE MADE THIS MATTER MOOT --------------------------------------------------- 26. The recent abolishment of the fund and the collection of monies by the National Science Foundation has made this subject moot. II. The Transition A. The NSI Agreement --------------------------------------------------- THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NSI UNDER THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT ARE EXCELLENT --------------------------------------------------- 27. The proposed transition arrangements with respect to NSI under the NSF cooperative are equitable and serve the interests of all parties concerned. B. Competitive Registries, Registrars, and the Addition of New gTLDs (ref. App 1) --------------------------------------------------- THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO A TRANSITION ARRANGEMENT OF FIVE NEW TLDS WITH ONE PER REGISTRY PROVIDER ARE EXCELLENT, BUT SHOULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO NATIONAL REGISTRIES --------------------------------------------------- 28. The proposals to introduce additional competition during the transition period are measured and appropriate. However they should also be applied to national registries for the reasons outlined in para. 19, above. Pioneer preferences seem appropriate. C. The Root Server System --------------------------------------------------- THE ROOT SERVER SYSTEM SHOULD REVIEWED AND TRANSITIONED AMONG THE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS RATHER THAN SECONDARY PARTIES --------------------------------------------------- 29. The root server system operation is properly a matter for the U.S. government, its management contractors including ISI and NSI, existing root server operators, and major Internet Service Providers. This should be coordinated by all these parties cooperating together to assure a robust, secure, and performant system. It should not involve outside interests such as technical society advisory committees - which is wholly inappropriate. D. The .us Domain --------------------------------------------------- TRANSFERRING THE .US DOMAIN TO AN MOTIVATED INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION UNDER APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS IS HIGHLY BENEFICIAL AND LONG OVERDUE --------------------------------------------------- 30. The assignment of the .US domain by the government's IANA function contractor - ISI - to itself to undertake other government specialty contracts was an inappropriate and ill-advised action at best. It has long been recognized that transferral of this function to an appropriate industry body - either for-profit or non-profit - under appropriate safeguards would be highly useful to an enormous number of U.S. users. As the NPRM notes, however, the current administrative arrangements are far too cumbersome. The matter deserves urgent attention, and could be easily effected during the transition period. 31. There is no reason whatsoever to move .GOV and .MIL users under a .US domain. This is a wholly unnecessary and costly undertaking. Those two domains can simply be recognized and administered as de facto U.S. domains as has long been the case. E. The Process --------------------------------------------------- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARTICULATED PRINCIPLES AND ROLE IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS ARE HIGHLY BENEFICIAL AND COMMENDABLE --------------------------------------------------- 32. The U.S. government and the associated officials and staff have played a highly positive and beneficial role with respect to these important Internet administrative functions. The articulated principles serve the interest of the public, industry, and the world. This is a unique time of transition when important models are being set for years to come. 33. The administration of Internet-related identifiers is potentially subject to significant anticompetitive abuse, as well as arbitrary behavior and personal favoritism. It inherently arises no matter how well intentioned the responsible staff or responsible officials. In addition, with respect some of these identifiers such as domain names, there may be important issues associated with freedom of expression. Making this activity subject to antitrust, First Amendment, and tort law of the Unites States provides an ideal check on wrongful behavior by those undertaking this activity. It is also patently where the most intense usage is occurring, and the support is likely to be efficient and the costs comparatively low. If significant demand for these services arises in different global regions, it is very easy to distribute them as has already been done for IP addresses. ------------------------------------- break ------------------------------------- Annex 1 SIGNIFICANT PARTIES OF INTEREST INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SERVICES AND USE DIRECT PARTIES OF INTEREST O Providers Root Admin Services Existing (1) New entrants (TBD) Root Server Services Existing (13) New entrants (TBD) TLD Services Existing gTLD (4) Existing nTLD (~200) New entrants (TBD) Sub-TLD Services (~70,000) Registration intermediaries (?) BIND server software (~10) Registration software (?) O Users and Uses Internet Service Providers Web site builders Trademark owners End user Business identity Professional identity Individual identity Branding & marketing Free expression Object owners places mobile agents Governments INDIRECT PARTIES OF INTEREST O Other Industry O Service providers O Software vendors O Hardware vendors O Telecom providers O Public O Ordinary people (50 million +) ### --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: [email protected] and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: [email protected]