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<nettime> Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas |
[From Le Monde diplomatique <[email protected]>, info at <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/>] _________________________________________________________________ A CENTRAL AMERICAN CLASSIC Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas (translated from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/dossiers/chiapas/ ) At first glance, it would be both unjust and almost irrelevent to blame the Mexican authorities for the murder of 45 inhabitants of the Chiapas village Acteal on 22 December 1997. As soon as the news broke out, President Ernesto Zedillo described the massacre as "cruel, absurd and unacceptable". On 3 January 1998 Minister of Interior Emilio Chuayffet tendered his resignation, followed on 7 January by Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, Governor of the State of Chiapas. As early as 9 January, 46 people were arrested and charged. Among them were the priista (1) mayor of Chenalho, Jacinto Arias Cruz (accused of providing the murderers with vehicles and weapons), and the director of public security of the State of Chiapas. After a swift investigation, 113 people were jailed. Control of the electorate in the federation's states, especially in rural areas, has long been in the hands of local oligarchies and casiques. Given the current discourse of the central government in support of a more democratic political system (witness the victory of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas of the Democratic Revolution Party as mayor of Mexico), it is hardly surprising to see local oligarchies distancing themselves from control from the centre, which they fear intends to change the rules of the game that have always assured them domination and impunity. But there is more to be said. On 26 December 1997 Jorge Madrazo, Attorney General of the Republic, went to the scene of the crime, expressed his solidarity with the victims and offered his explanation of the events. "Since the 1930s acts of great violence have been witnessed in the commune of Chenalho and other communes of Chiapas and this situation has unfortunately never disappeared. These conflicts can be labelled as inter-communal in the context of constant disputes between local political and economic powers. They also stem from the existence of religious diversity and, more recently, ideological divisions (2)". This is an overly simplistic explanation. Just between 1982-88, under the governorship of General Castellanos, human rights organisations recorded 153 political assassinations in Chiapas (inter-communal?), 692 abusive incarcerations (disputes?), 503 sequestrations accompanied by torture (religious diversity?), 407 expulsions of families from their communities, 54 expulsions from villages, 12 rapes and 29 attacks against protest movements. In 1988 and 1990, the state's penal code was revised, penalising various offences said to be "political", including the occupation of public roads and public buildings and "tumultuous" gatherings, all of which are traditional means of expression of peasant populations (3). This series of violations of basic rights was not unrelated to the January 1994 uprising and was a far cry from the usual "local disputes". On 23 January, in Kanasin (Yucatan), President Zedillo pledged not to use force to resolve the Chiapas conflict. This was all very well. But at the same time, the defence minister was sending several military detachments to the area to "re-establish a climate of security and avoid confrontations between rival groups". This is a return to a strategy developed in the 1980s in Central America by, among others, the Christian Democrats in Salvador: a democratic government "squeezed" between two extremes - of the far left and the far right - which did not differentiate between an armed social movement (the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional - FMLN) and the death squads. And, on the pretext of fighting the death squads, it attacked the FMLN. It was no secret that a proliferation of paramilitary groups - Peace and Justice, the Chinchulines, the Red Mask, the Throat Cutters, the Alliance San Bartolome de los llanos, the Mixed Operations Brigades, the Indigenous Anti-Zapatista Revolutionary Movement, the Tomas Muntzer Community, etc. - were operating in Chiapas, sowing terror and causing massive population displacements, with the passive - if not active - complicity of the army and the authorities. An investigation revealed that former military and police personel had trained Red Mask, the group held responsible for the Acteal massacre. The arrest on 2 April of General Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz (until then in hiding) confirmed the involvement of the army at its highest level: the general commanded a detachment of 40 troops posted nearby, who could have prevented the tragedy, but failed to do so. This shows the strategy (and the real responsibility) of the authorities: the "militarisation" of a large portion of the territory and an appeal, albeit more discreet, to the paramilitary (by nature "uncontrollable") to embark on a sweeping repression of the whole social movement. The tragedy of Acteal is only one unfortunate "bungle" which came to public attention both because of its extent and, consequently, the reactions it produced - not only internationally. Negotiations carried out between the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the government had allowed the signing in February 1996 of the San Andres Accords. Based on these accords, the Commission for Reconciliation and Peace (Cocopa), comprising delegates of all parties represented in parliament, presented a bill integrating their content into state legislation, which would mean a reform of the constitution. The minister of the interior, Francisco Labastida Ochoa said on 1 March 1998: "If the government signed the San Andres Accords, it was obviously to comply with them. The president of the republic has on numerous occasions stated that the government will stand by its commitment: this is not negotiable. Whoever says otherwise would be telling a lie. The Cocopa has drawn up a proposal of constitutional reform. This project has never been approved by the government. We have never committed ourselves in this area. Nothing has been signed". In fact, the authorities, alleging that indigenous autonomy and its effects would constitute an encroachment upon national sovereignty and the unity of Mexico, have reneged on their commitments. A government bill on constitutional reform presented on 15 March 1998 by President Zedillo was rejected by the Zapatistas and by the main opposition party, the Democratic Revolution Party (PDR). The EZLN refuses to renew negotiations but the Zapatista social bases are unilaterally implementing the Accords by forming 38 autonomous municipios. More than the EZLN (which has not fired a single shot since January 1994), it is this process of pacific social organisation led by the indigenous people that the authorities intend to crush. As in Central America, where "the guerrilla moves amongst the people as fish in water", the objective is to take the water away from the fish. A large portion of the rural population of Chiapas now live in a state of military occupation. And the paramilitary groups have instituted a reign of terror. All the authorities need do is to restore the discretion necessary to any campaign aimed at regaining control. Since 1996, 4,435 foreigners have accessed the conflict zones, most of them members of some 200 non-governmental organisations (4). What we see here is, more or less, and without any formal link, a process successfully applied in Guatemala in the early 1990s: the presence of international observers with two major missions: to dissuade, by their presence, violations of human rights, and to spread information to the outside world. In the context of an official campaign against foreigners who are being accused of "manipulating the indigenous", some fifteen people were "shown out" of the country between 13 and 16 April. A 67 year-old Frenchman, Michel Chanteau, priest of Chenalhe for the past 32 years, was also expelled, accused of "pro-Zapatista activism" (three other members of the clergy had been similarly treated). Repression, isolation and silence: these are the ingredients which accompanied the "pacification" campaigns applied in Central America not so long ago. ______________________________________________ (1) Member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party which has held power for over 60 years. (2) Le Mexique aujourd'hui, Information service of the Mexican embassy, Paris, no. 68-69, December 1997-January 1998. (3) "Rapport Mexique", Federation internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme (FIDH), no 251, February 1998. (4) El Pais, February 13 1998. MAURICE LEMOINE. <[email protected]> _________________________________________________________________ See also : * The fourth world war has begun, by sub-commandante Marcos, ao�t 1997. http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/08-09/marcos.html On the Web ---------- * EZLN. - http://www.ezln.org/ * FZLN. - http://spin.com.mx/~floresu/FZLN/ * Sipaz. - http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/ * Tendance floue. - http://www.chez.com/tf/ * Zapatistas in Cyberspace. - http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Le Monde diplomatique. - http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/ --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: [email protected] and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: [email protected]