[Nettime-ro] Re: Paranoia

["Dan Masca" <dan@reea.net>]

Un prieten din Canada ma intreba zilele trecute : " Stii cine este cel mai
mare finatator al ornganizatiei "GreenPeace" ? "
I-am raspuns rapid si sincer : "Nu" .

El imi zice sec : "Guvernul SUA ."

POate o fi adevarat ceea ce spune ,poate nu .
Dar daca este adevarat atunci...

Mai jos aveti un articol interesant !

Dan MASCA


>From "Newsweek" :

> The Arrogant Empire
>
> America's unprecedented power scares the world, and the Bush
administration
> has only made it worse. How we got here-and what we can do about it now
>
>
>
>       By Fareed Zakaria
>
> NEWSWEEK
>
>
>
>
>
>       March 24 issue -  PART I: The United States will soon be at war with
> Iraq. It would seem, on the face of it, a justifiable use of military
force.
> Saddam Hussein runs one of the most tyrannical regimes in modern history.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>           FOR MORE THAN 25 years he has sought to acquire chemical,
> biological and nuclear weapons, and has, in several documented cases,
> succeeded. He gassed 60,000 of his own people in 1986 in Halabja. He has
> launched two catastrophic wars, sacrificing nearly a million Iraqis and
> killing or wounding more than a million Iranians. He has flouted 16 United
> Nations resolutions over 12 years that have warned him to disarm or else,
> including one, four months ago, giving him a "final opportunity" to do so
> "fully and immediately" or face "serious consequences." But in its
campaign
> against Iraq, America is virtually alone. Never will it have waged a war
in
> such isolation. Never have so many of its allies been so firmly opposed to
> its policies. Never has it provoked so much public opposition, resentment
> and mistrust. And all this before the first shot has been fired.
>
>        Watching the tumult around the world, it's evident that what is
> happening goes well beyond this particular crisis. Many people, both
abroad
> and in America, fear that we are at some kind of turning point, where
> well-established mainstays of the global order-the Western Alliance,
> European unity, the United Nations-seem to be cracking under stress. These
> strains go well beyond the matter of Iraq, which is not vital enough to
> wreak such damage. In fact, the debate is not about Saddam anymore. It is
> about America and its role in the new world. To understand the present
> crisis, we must first grasp how the rest of the world now perceives
American
> power.
>
>         It is true that the United States has some allies in its efforts
to
> topple Saddam. It is also true that some of the governments opposing
action
> in Iraq do so not for love of peace and international harmony but for more
> cynical reasons. France and Russia have a long history of trying to weaken
> the containment of Iraq to ensure that they can have good trading
relations
> with it. France, after all, helped Saddam Hussein build a nuclear reactor
> that was obviously a launching pad for a weapons program. (Why would the
> world's second largest oil producer need a nuclear power plant?) And
> France's Gaullist tendencies are, of course, simply its own version of
> unilateralism.
>
>
>
>
>
>           But how to explain that the vast majority of the world, with
> little to gain from it, is in the Franco-Russian camp? The administration
> claims that many countries support the United States but do so quietly.
That
> signals an even deeper problem. Countries are furtive in their support for
> the administration not because they fear Saddam Hussein but because they
> fear their own people. To support America today in much of the world is
> politically dangerous. Over the past year the United States became a
> campaign issue in elections in Germany, South Korea and Pakistan. Being
> anti-American was a vote-getter in all three places.
>
>         Look at the few countries that do publicly support us. Tony Blair
> bravely has forged ahead even though the vast majority of the British
people
> disagree with him and deride him as "America's poodle." The leaders of
Spain
> and Italy face equally strong public opposition to their stands. Donald
> Rumsfeld has proclaimed, with his characteristic tactlessness, that while
> "old Europe"-France and Germany-might oppose U.S. policy, "new Europe"
> embraces them. This is not exactly right. The governments of Central
Europe
> support Washington, but the people oppose it in almost the same numbers as
> in old Europe. Between 70 and 80 percent of Hungarians, Czechs and Poles
are
> against an American war in Iraq, with or without U.N. sanction. (The Poles
> are more supportive in some surveys.) The administration has made much of
> the support of Vaclav Havel, the departing Czech president. But the
incoming
> president, Vaclav Klaus-a pro-American, Thatcherite free-marketer-said
last
> week that on Iraq his position is aligned with that of his people.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>        Some make the argument that Europeans are now pacifists, living in
a
> "postmodern paradise," shielded from threats and unable to imagine the
need
> for military action. But then how to explain the sentiment in Turkey, a
> country that sits on the Iraqi border? A longtime ally, Turkey has fought
> with America in conflicts as distant as the Korean War, and supported
every
> American military action since then. But opposition to the war now runs
more
> than 90 percent there. Despite Washington's offers of billions of dollars
in
> new assistance, the government cannot get parliamentary support to allow
> American troops to move into Iraq from Turkish bases. Or consider
Australia,
> another crucial ally, and another country where a majority now opposes
> American policy. Or Ireland. Or India. In fact, while the United States
has
> the backing of a dozen or so governments, it has the support of a majority
> of the people in only one country in the world, Israel. If that is not
> isolation, then the word has no meaning.
>
>         It is also too easy to dismiss the current crisis as one more in a
> series of transatlantic family squabbles that stretch back over the
decades.
> Some in Washington have pointed out that whenever the United States has
> taken strong military action-for example, the deployment of Pershing
nuclear
> missiles in Europe in the early 1980s-there was popular opposition in
> Europe. True, but this time it's different. The street demonstrations and
> public protests of the early 1980s made for good television images. But
the
> reality was that in most polls, 30 to 40 percent of Europeans supported
> American policies. In Germany, where pacifist feelings ran sky high, 53
> percent of Germans supported the Pershing deployments, according to a 1981
> poll in Der Spiegel. In France, a majority supported American policy
through
> much of Ronald Reagan's two terms, even prefer-ring him to the Democratic
> candidate, Walter Mondale, in 1984.
>
>
>
>         Josef Joffe, one of Germany's leading commentators, observes that
> during the cold war anti-Americanism was a left-wing phenomenon. "In
> contrast to it, there was always a center-right that was anti-communist
and
> thus pro-American," he explains. "The numbers waxed and waned, but you
> always had a solid base of support for the United States." The cold war
kept
> Europe pro-American. For example, 1968 was a time of mass protests against
> American policies in Vietnam, but it was also the year of the Soviet
> invasion of Czechoslovakia. Europeans (and Asians) could oppose America,
but
> their views were balanced by wariness of the Soviet threat and communist
> behavior. Again, the polls bear this out. European opposition even to the
> Vietnam War never approached the level of the current opposition to Iraq.
> This was true outside Europe as well. In Australia, for example, a
majority
> of the public supported that country's participation in the Vietnam War
> through 1971, when it withdrew its forces.
>
>         But today no such common threat exists, and support for America is
> far more fluid. Center-right parties might still support Washington, but
> many do so almost out of inertia and without much popular support for
their
> stand. During the recent German election, Gerhard Schroder campaigned
openly
> against America's Iraq policy. Less noted was that his conservative
> opponent, Edmund Stoiber, did so as well, at one point (briefly)
outflanking
> Schroder by saying he would not even allow American bases in Germany to
> participate in the war.
>
>         In one respect, I believe that the Bush administration is right:
> this war will look better when it is over. The military campaign will
> probably be less difficult than many of Washington's opponents think. Most
> important, it will reveal the nature of Saddam's barbarous regime.
Prisoners
> and political dissidents will tell stories of atrocities. Horrific
documents
> will come to light. Weapons of mass destruction will be found. If done
> right, years from now people will remember above all that America helped
rid
> Iraq of a totalitarian dictator.
>
>         But the administration is wrong if it believes that a successful
war
> will make the world snap out of a deep and widening mistrust and
resentment
> of American foreign policy. A war with Iraq, even if successful, might
solve
> the Iraq problem. It doesn't solve the America problem. What worries
people
> around the world above all else is living in a world shaped and dominated
by
> one country-the United States. And they have come to be deeply suspicious
> and fearful of us.
>
>
>
> PART II: THE AGE OF GENEROSITY
>
>         Most Americans have never felt more vulnerable. September 11 was
not
> only the first attack on the American mainland in 150 years, but it was
also
> sudden and unexpected. Three thousand civilians were brutally killed
without
> any warning. In the months that followed, Americans worried about anthrax
> attacks, biological terror, dirty bombs and new suicide squads. Even now,
> the day-to-day rhythms of American life are frequently interrupted by
terror
> alerts and warnings. The average American feels a threat to his physical
> security unknown since the early years of the republic.
>
>         Yet after 9-11, the rest of the world saw something quite
different.
> They saw a country that was hit by terrorism, as some of them had been,
but
> that was able to respond on a scale that was almost unimaginable. Suddenly
> terrorism was the world's chief priority, and every country had to
reorient
> its foreign policy accordingly. Pakistan had actively supported the
Taliban
> for years; within months it became that regime's sworn enemy. Washington
> announced that it would increase its defense budget by almost $50 billion,
a
> sum greater than the total annual defense budget of Britain or Germany. A
> few months later it toppled a regime 6,000 miles away-almost entirely from
> the air-in Afghanistan, a country where the British and Soviet empires
were
> bogged down at the peak of their power. It is now clear that the current
era
> can really have only one name, the unipolar world-an age with only one
> global power. America's position today is unprecedented. A hundred years
> ago, Britain was a superpower, ruling a quarter of the globe's population.
> But it was still only the second or third richest country in the world and
> one among many strong military powers. The crucial measure of military
might
> in the early 20th century was naval power, and Britain ruled the waves
with
> a fleet as large as the next two navies put together. By contrast, the
> United States will spend as much next year on defense as the rest of the
> world put together (yes, all 191 countries). And it will do so devoting 4
> percent of its GDP, a low level by postwar standards.
>
>
>
>        American dominance is not simply military. The U.S. economy is as
> large as the next three-Japan, Germany and Britain-put together. With 5
> percent of the world's population, this one country accounts for 43
percent
> of the world's economic production, 40 percent of its high-technology
> production and 50 percent of its research and development. If you look at
> the indicators of future growth, all are favorable for America. It is more
> dynamic economically, more youthful demographically and more flexible
> culturally than any other part of the world. It is conceivable that
> America's lead, especially over an aging and sclerotic Europe, will
actually
> increase over the next two decades.
>
>         Given this situation, perhaps what is most surprising is that the
> world has not ganged up on America already. Since the beginnings of the
> state system in the 16th century, international politics has seen one
clear
> pattern-the formation of balances of power against the strong. Countries
> with immense military and economic might arouse fear and suspicion, and
soon
> others coalesce against them. It happened to the Hapsburg Empire in the
17th
> century, France in the late 18th and early 19th century, Germany twice in
> the early 20th century, and the Soviet Union in the latter half of the
20th
> century. At this point, most Americans will surely protest: "But we're
> different!" Americans-this writer included-think of themselves as a nation
> that has never sought to occupy others, and that through the years has
been
> a progressive and liberating force. But historians tell us that all
dominant
> powers thought they were special. Their very success confirmed for them
that
> they were blessed. But as they became ever more powerful, the world saw
them
> differently. The English satirist John Dryden described this phenomenon in
a
> poem set during the Biblical King David's reign. "When the chosen people
> grew too strong," he wrote, "The rightful cause at length became the
wrong."
>
>         Has American power made its rightful cause turn into wrong? Will
> America simply have to learn to live in splendid isolation from the
> resentments of the world? This is certainly how some Americans see things.
> And it's true that some of the opposition to the United States is thinly
> veiled envy. "Scratch an anti-American in Europe, and very often all he
> wants is a guest professorship at Harvard or to have an article published
in
> The New York Times," says Denis MacShane, Britain's minister for Europe.
>
>         But there lies a deep historical fallacy in the view that "they
hate
> us because we are strong." After all, U.S. supremacy is hardly a recent
> phenomenon. America has been the leading world power for almost a century
> now. By 1900 the United States was the richest country in the world. By
1919
> it had decisively intervened to help win the largest war in history. By
1945
> it had led the Allies to victory in World War II. For 10 years thereafter
> America accounted for 50 percent of world GDP, a much larger share than it
> holds today.
>
>         Yet for five decades after World War II, there was no general rush
> to gang up against the United States. Instead countries joined with
> Washington to confront the Soviet Union, a much poorer country (at best
> comprising 12 percent of world GDP, or a quarter the size of the American
> economy). What explains this? How-until now-did America buck the biggest
> trend in international history?
>
>         To answer this question, go back to 1945. When America had the
world
> at its feet, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman chose not to
create
> an American imperium, but to build a world of alliances and multilateral
> institutions. They formed the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system of
> economic cooperation and dozens of other international organizations.
> America helped get the rest of the world back on its feet by pumping out
> vast amounts of aid and private investment. The centerpiece of this
effort,
> the Marshall Plan, amounted to $120 billion in today's dollars.
>
>         Not least of these efforts was the special attention given to
> diplomacy. Consider what it must have meant for Franklin Roosevelt-at the
> pinnacle of power-to go halfway across the world to Tehran and Yalta to
meet
> with Churchill and Stalin in 1943 and 1945. Roosevelt was a sick man,
> paralyzed from the waist down, hauling 10 pounds of steel braces on his
> legs. Traveling for 40 hours by sea and air took the life out of him. He
did
> not have to go. He had plenty of deputies-Marshall, Eisenhower-who could
> have done the job. And he certainly could have summoned the others closer
to
> him. But FDR understood that American power had to be coupled with a
> generosity of spirit. He insisted that British commanders like Montgomery
be
> given their fair share of glory in the war. He brought China into the
United
> Nations Security Council, even though it was a poor peasant society,
because
> he believed that it was important to have the largest Asian country
properly
> represented within a world body.
>
>         The standard set by Roosevelt and his generation endured. When
> George Marshall devised the Marshall Plan, he insisted that America should
> not dictate how its money be spent, but rather that the initiatives and
> control should lie with Europeans. For decades thereafter, the United
States
> has provided aid, technical know-how and assistance across the world. It
has
> built dams, funded magazines and sent scholars and students abroad so that
> people got to know America and Americans. It has paid great deference to
its
> allies who were in no sense equals. It has conducted joint military
> exercises, even when they added little to U.S. readiness. For half a
> century, American presidents and secretaries of State have circled the
globe
> and hosted their counterparts in a never-ending cycle of diplomacy.
>
>         Of course, all these exertions served our interests, too. They
> produced a pro-American world that was rich and secure. They laid the
> foundations for a booming global economy in which America thrives. But it
> was an enlightened self-interest that took into account the interests of
> others. Above all, it reassured countries-through word and deed, style and
> substance-that America's mammoth power need not be feared.
>
>
>
> PART III: WHERE BUSH WENT WRONG
>
>         George W. Bush came into office with few developed ideas about
> foreign policy. He didn't seem much interested in the world. During the
> years that his father was envoy to China, ambassador to the United
Nations,
> director of the CIA and vice president, Bush traveled two or three times
> outside the country. Candidate Bush's vision amounted mostly to carving
out
> positions different from his predecessor. Many conservatives thought the
> Clinton administration was over-involved in the world, especially in
> nation-building, and hectoring in its diplomacy. So Bush argued that
America
> should be "a humble nation," scale back its commitments abroad and not
> involve itself in rebuilding other countries.
>
>
>
>  Odd man out? George W. Bush
>
>
>
>        Yet other conservatives, a number of whom became powerful within
the
> administration, had a more sweeping agenda. Since the early '90s, they had
> argued that the global landscape was marked by two realities. One was
> American power. The post-cold-war world was overwhelmingly unipolar. The
> other was the spread of new international treaties and laws. The end of
the
> cold war had given a boost to efforts to create a global consensus on
topics
> like war crimes, land mines and biological weapons. Both observations were
> accurate. From them, however, these Bush officials drew the strange
> conclusion that America had little freedom to move in this new world. "The
> picture it painted in its early months was of a behemoth thrashing about
> against constraints that only it could see," notes the neoconservative
> writer Robert Kagan. For much of the world, it was mystifying to hear the
> most powerful country in the history of the world speak as though it were
a
> besieged nation, boxed in on all sides.
>
>         In its first year the administration withdrew from five
> international treaties-and did so as brusquely as it could. It reneged on
> virtually every diplomatic effort that the Clinton administration had
> engaged in, from North Korea to the Middle East, often overturning public
> statements from Colin Powell supporting these efforts. It developed a
> language and diplomatic style that seemed calculated to offend the world.
> (President Bush has placed a portrait of Theodore Roosevelt in the White
> House. TR's most famous words of advice are worth recalling: "Speak softly
> and carry a big stick.") Key figures in the administration rarely
traveled,
> foreign visitors were treated to perfunctory office visits, and state
> dinners were unheard of. On an annual basis, George W. Bush has visited
> fewer foreign countries than any president in 40 years. Still, he does
> better than Dick Cheney, who has been abroad only once since becoming vice
> president.
>
>         September 11 only added a new layer of assertiveness to Bush's
> foreign policy. Understandably shocked and searching for responses, the
> administration decided that it needed total freedom of action. When NATO,
> for the first time in its history, invoked the self-defense clause and
> offered America carte-blanche assistance, the administration essentially
> ignored it. It similarly marginalized NATO in the Afghan war. NATO has its
> limitations, which were powerfully revealed during the Kosovo campaign,
but
> the signal this sent to our closest allies was that America didn't need
> them. Thus as seen by the rest of the world, 9-11 had a distressingly
> paradoxical effect. It produced a mobilization of American power and yet a
> narrowing of American interests. Suddenly, Washington was more powerful
and
> determined to act. But it would act only for its own core security and
even
> pre-emptively when it needed to. Bush later announced an expansive, vague
> Wilsonian vision-which has merit-but his style and methods overshadowed
its
> potential promise.
>
>         The Bush administration could reasonably point out that it doesn't
> get enough credit for reaching out to the rest of the world. President
Bush
> has, after all, worked with the United Nations on Iraq, increased foreign
> aid by 50 percent, announced a $15 billion AIDS program and formally
> endorsed a Palestinian state. Yet none of these actions seems to earn him
> any good will. The reason for this is plain. In almost every case, the
> administration comes to multilateralism grudgingly, reluctantly, and with
a
> transparent lack of sincerity. For a year now, President Bush has
dismissed
> the notion that he should make any effort toward a Middle East peace
> process, even though it would have defused some of the anti-Americanism in
> the region as he sought to confront Iraq. Suddenly last week, to gain
allies
> on Iraq and at the insistence of Tony Blair, Bush made a belated gesture
> toward the peace process. Is it surprising that people are not hailing
this
> last-minute conversion?
>
>
>
>
>
> The United States: Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction, is
> failing to cooperate with weapons inspectors and is violating its
> obligations under U.N resolutions. President Bush said March 6 that the
> United States will seek a vote on its draft resolution that would pave the
> way for military action, although he warned, "We really don't need
anybody's
> permission."
>
>
>
> China: Supports continued inspections and wants the crisis resolved
> peacefully. On March 7, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told the Security
> Council that the goal of disarming Iraq can be achieved "as long as we
stick
> to the road of political settlement."
>
> Britain: Prefers a second Security Council resolution authorizing any
> military action, but is expected to join U.S.-led action without one.
> Britain has suggested a two-phase approach to the draft resolution, under
> which Saddam Hussein would be given 10 days to prove disarmament by
meeting
> certain conditions followed by the second phase of verification of the
same.
>
> France: Open to dialogue but still won't support any U.N. resolution that
> would authorize war on Iraq. France also has rejected giving Saddam
Hussein
> an ultimatum to disarm, as set in the amended resolution proposed by the
> United States and its allies, and hinted it will veto the proposal.
Foreign
> Minister Dominique de Villepin described the deadline as a "pretext for
> war."
>
> Angola: The government says the March 17 deadline is too short for Iraq to
> demonstrate that it is disarming and along with the other five undecided
> nations proposed a longer deadline for Saddam to comply with the United
> Nations.
>
> Bulgaria: Indicated it would support U.S.-led military intervention
without
> a Security Council authorization.
>
> Cameroon: U.S. officials believe Cameroon will ultimately side with
> Washington. But to date, the government says the current disarmament
> deadline is too short and is pressing, along with the other five undecided
> nations, to give more time for Saddam to comply with the United Nations.
>
> Chile: Believes the March 17 deadline is too short for Iraq. On March 14,
> the government proposed a compromise plan that would give Saddam up to a
> month to meet certain benchmarks on disarmament or face military action.
>
> Guinea: The current holder of the Security Council presidency, Guinea has
> joined the other five undecided nations in proposing a longer deadline for
> Saddam to comply with the United Nations. State radio reported on March 12
> that the government would abstain if forced to vote on the current
> resolution.
>
> Germany: Insists Iraq must be disarmed peacefully and has said it will not
> participate in any military intervention, even if the Security Council
> authorizes such action. Germany joined with France and Russia on March 5
to
> say the three nations would block the U.S.-backed war resolution.
>
> Mexico: Under fierce pressure from its northern neighbor, Mexico has
joined
> the other five 'swing' nations to propose a longer deadline for Saddam to
> comply with the United Nations.
>
>
>
> Pakistan: The beneficiary of a multi-million dollar aid package since it
> helped Washington in the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan has said it won't
> support the resolution in its current form.
>
> Syria: Damascus says Iraq is cooperating with its obligations under U.N.
> resolutions and has called for U.N. sanctions to be lifted. It will not
> support any new resolution.
>
> Spain: Supports the Bush administration's stance on Iraq and has
> co-sponsored, along with the United States and Britain, a draft resolution
> that would pave the way for military action.
>
>
>
>        Nowhere has this appearance of diplomatic hypocrisy been more
> striking than on Iraq. The president got high marks for his superb speech
at
> the Security Council last September, urging the United Nations to get
> serious about enforcing its resolutions on Iraq and to try inspections one
> last time. Unfortunately, that appeal had been preceded by speeches by
> Cheney and comments by Rumsfeld calling inspections a sham-statements that
> actually contradicted American policy-and making clear that the
> administration had decided to go to war. The only debate was whether to
have
> the United Nations rubber-stamp this policy. To make matters worse, weeks
> after the new U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolution calling for fresh
inspections,
> the administration began large-scale deployments on Iraq's border.
> Diplomatically, it had promised a good-faith effort to watch how the
> inspections were going; militarily, it was gearing up for war with troops
> that could not stay ready in the desert forever. Is it any wonder that
other
> countries, even those that would be willing to endorse a war with Iraq,
have
> felt that the diplomacy was a charade, pursued simply to allow time for
> military preparations?
>
>         President Bush's favorite verb is "expect." He announces
> peremptorily that he "expects" the Palestinians to dump Yasir Arafat,
> "expects" countries to be with him or against him, "expects" Turkey to
> cooperate. It is all part of the administration's basic approach toward
> foreign policy, which is best described by the phrase used for its war
> plan-"shock and awe." The notion is that the United States needs to
> intimidate countries with its power and assertiveness, always threatening,
> always denouncing, never showing weakness. Donald Rumsfeld often quotes a
> line from Al Capone: "You will get more with a kind word and a gun than
with
> a kind word alone."
>
>         But should the guiding philosophy of the world's leading democracy
> really be the tough talk of a Chicago mobster? In terms of effectiveness,
> this strategy has been a disaster. It has alienated friends and delighted
> enemies. Having traveled around the world and met with senior government
> officials in dozens of countries over the past year, I can report that
with
> the exception of Britain and Israel, every country the administration has
> dealt with feels humiliated by it. "Most officials in Latin American
> countries today are not anti-American types," says Jorge Castaneda, the
> reformist foreign minister of Mexico, who resigned two months ago. "We
have
> studied in the United States or worked there. We like and understand
> America. But we find it extremely irritating to be treated with utter
> contempt." Last fall, a senior ambassador to the United Nations, in a
speech
> supporting America's position on Iraq, added an innocuous phrase that
could
> have been seen as deviating from that support. The Bush administration
> called up his foreign minister and demanded that he be formally
reprimanded
> within an hour. The ambassador now seethes when he talks about U.S.
> arrogance. Does this really help America's cause in the world? There are
> dozens of stories like this from every part of the world.
>
>         In diplomacy, style is often substance. Consider this fact: the
> Clinton administration used force on three important occasions-Bosnia,
Haiti
> and Kosovo. In none of them did it take the matter to the United Nations
> Security Council, and there was little discussion that it needed to do so.
> Indeed, Kofi Annan later made statements that seemed to justify the action
> in Kosovo, explaining that state sovereignty should not be used as a cover
> for humanitarian abuses. Today Annan has (wrongly) announced that American
> action in Iraq outside the United Nations will be "illegal." While the
> Clinton administration-or the first Bush administration-was assertive in
> many ways, people did not seek assurances about its intentions. The Bush
> administration does not bear all the blame for this dramatic change in
> attitudes. Because of 9-11, it has had to act forcefully on the world
stage
> and assert American power. But that should have been all the more reason
to
> adopt a posture of consultation and cooperation while doing what needed to
> be done. The point is to scare our enemies, not terrify the rest of the
> world.
>
>
>
> PART IV: THE WAY TO BUCK HISTORY
>
>         In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, then a senior official in the first Bush
> administration, authored a Pentagon document that argued that in an era of
> overwhelming American dominance, U.S. foreign policy should be geared
toward
> maintaining our advantage and discouraging the rise of other great powers.
> The premise behind this strategy is perfectly sensible. The United States
> should attempt to lengthen its era of supremacy for as long as it can. Any
> country would try to do the same (though a wise one would not be foolish
> enough to announce it). For that reason, the elder Bush ordered the
Pentagon
> to water down the document so that it was not quite so arrogant.
>
>
>
>         In principle, American power is not simply good for America; it is
> good for the world. Most of the problems the world faces today-from
> terrorism to AIDS to nuclear proliferation-will be solved not with less
U.S.
> engagement but with more. The lesson of the 1990s-of Bosnia, Kosovo, East
> Timor, Rwanda-is surely that American action, with all its flaws, is
better
> than inaction. Other countries are simply not ready or able, at this
point,
> to take on the challenges and burdens of leadership. Around the world,
> people understand this. In a global survey taken last year, the most
> intriguing-and unreported-finding was that large majorities of people in
> most countries thought that the world would be a more dangerous place if
> there were a rival to the American superpower. Sixty-four percent of the
> French, 70 percent of Mexicans, 63 percent of Jordanians felt this way.
> (Ironically, old Europe was more pro-American on this issue than new
Europe.
> Only 27 percent of Bulgarians agreed.)
>
>         The real question is how America should wield its power. For the
> past half century it has done so through alliances and global institutions
> and in a consensual manner. Now it faces new challenges-and not simply
> because of what the Bush administration has done. The old order is
changing.
> The alliances forged during the cold war are weakening. Institutions built
> to reflect the realities of 1945-such as the U.N. Security Council-risk
> becoming anachronistic. But if the administration wishes to further
weak-en
> and indeed destroy these institutions and traditions-by dismissing or
> neglecting them-it must ask itself: What will take their place? By what
> means will America maintain its hegemony?
>
>         For some in the administration, the answer is obvious: America
will
> act as it chooses, using what allies it can find in any given situation.
As
> a statement of fact this is sometimes the only approach Washington will be
> able to employ. But it is not a durable long-term strategy. It would
require
> America to build new alliances and arrangements every time it faced a
> crisis. More important, operating in a conspicuously unconstrained way, in
> service of a strategy to maintain primacy, will paradoxically produce the
> very competition it hopes to avoid. The last two years are surely
> instructive. The Bush administration's swagger has generated international
> opposition and active measures to thwart its will. Though countries like
> France and Russia cannot become great-power competitors simply because
they
> want to-they need economic and military strength-they can use what
influence
> they have to disrupt American policy, as they are doing over Iraq. In
fact,
> the less responsibility we give them, the more freedom smaller powers have
> to make American goals difficult to achieve.
>
>         In many cases the United States simply can't "go it alone." The
> current crises over North Korea, Iran's nuclear program and the leakage of
> fissile materials from Russia are all good examples. And while the United
> States can act largely by itself in certain special circumstances, such as
> Iraq, the fewer allies, bases and air rights it has, the higher the costs
> will be in American lives and treasure. And those costs will become
> unbearable if the United States has to both wage war and pay for postwar
> reconstruction on its own.
>
>         The war on terror has given the United States a core security
> interest in the stability of societies. Failed states can become terrorist
> havens. That means we must focus attention and expenditures on
> nation-building. For all its flaws, the United Nations is doing
> on-the-ground work to create stable societies in Afghanistan, Kosovo,
> Cambodia and Mozambique-and for the most part, it's succeeding. The
European
> Union and Japan pay most of these bills. Were Washington to move to an
> entirely ad hoc approach, why would the rest of the world agree to clean
up
> its messes?
>
>         Fighting terror also requires constant cooperation with countries
> across the globe. America could not have captured Qaeda strategist Khalid
> Shaikh Mohammed without the active partnership of Pakistan. And yet if you
> ask Pakistanis what they have gotten for this, they will point out that
> American tariffs continue to strangle their textile industry and U.S. aid
> remains meager. Having asked for help in de-Islamizing their education
> system-a matter of crucial concern to America-they have received little.
> Meanwhile the overall tone of Bush administration foreign policy has made
> General Musharraf embarrassed to be pro-American.
>
>         The last point is perhaps the most crucial one. Being pro-American
> should not be a political liability for our allies. The diplomatic fiasco
> over Turkey is an excellent example. For well over a year now it has been
> obvious to anyone watching that the Turkish people were deeply opposed to
a
> war in Iraq. Yet the administration assumed that it could bully or bribe
> Turkey into giving it basing rights. But Turkey over the last year has
> become more democratic. The military is less willing to overrule
> politicians. The new ruling party, AK, is more open to internal debate
than
> Turkey's other parties. It allowed its members to vote freely on the
motion
> to allow America basing rights, only to have it defeated. Since more than
90
> percent of the Turks oppose giving America basing rights, this should not
> have been surprising. The administration wants democracy in the Middle
East.
> Well, it got it.
>
>         As usual, diplomatic style played a role. "The way the U.S. has
been
> conducting the negotiations has been, in general, humiliating," says a
> retired senior diplomat, Ozdem Sanberk.
>
>         The costs of this mishap are real. If Turkey allowed America to
open
> a second front, we could end the war more quickly and with fewer
casualties,
> and the thorny issues relating to Turkish-Kurdish relations could be more
> easily handled. But the larger lesson is surely that in an increasingly
> democratic world American power must be seen as legitimate not only by
other
> governments but by their people. Does America really want a world in which
> it gets its way in the face of constant public anger only by twisting
arms,
> offering bribes and allying with dictators?
>
>         There are many specific ways for the United States to rebuild its
> relations with the world. It can match its military buildup with
diplomatic
> efforts that demonstrate its interest and engagement in the world's
> problems. It can stop oversubsidizing American steelworkers, farmers and
> textile-mill owners, and open its borders to goods from poorer countries.
> But above all, it must make the world comfortable with its power by
leading
> through consensus. America's special role in the world-its ability to buck
> history-is based not simply on its great strength, but on a global faith
> that this power is legitimate. If America squanders that, the loss will
> outweigh any gains in domestic security. And this next American century
> could prove to be lonely, brutish and short.
>

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