SaB* on Sat, 22 Mar 2003 17:50:12 +0100 (CET) |
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Re: [rohrpost] shock and awe/ b - o - y - k - o - t - t |
wenn du schon und wieder so viel nachdenkst �ber boykott und anderes (eventuell noch ein embargo?), dann versuch doch mal vom nationalistischen (boykotiert amerika) zum herstellerorientierten (boykotiert die kriegsindustrie und krieggewinnler und kriegsunterst�tzer) denken zu wechseln. dann gewinnt dein unterfangen an sch�rfe. lg, -- SaB* On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, Oliver Grau wrote: > Vielleicht waere ein Boykott amerikanischer Produkte doch noch einmal > ernsthaft zu ueberlegen. Ich moechte meine zunaechst ablehnende Haltung > zuruecknehmen, die nur von einer bundesrepublikanischen Perspektive > ausging. Da mittlerweile jedoch weltweit Boykottueberlegungen diskutiert > und begonnen werden (von Esso bis zur Filmindustrie), sollten wir uns > anschliessen. Die alte Gandhi Idee koennte, wenn sie nun erstmals ueber das > Netz effektiv organisiert und weltweit praktiziert wird, vielleicht doch > Wirkung zeigen. > > > > At 17:11 22.03.03 +0100, you wrote: > > > >das buch zum angriff: > >"Shock & Awe. Achieving Rapid Dominance." 1996. > >http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html > > > > > >kleine kostprobe: > > > >"It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently the > >most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time > >to come. Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose > >major excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of > >military superiority? For reasons noted in this study, we believe > >that excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of > >current defense approaches. There are several overrarching realities > >that have led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes > >that the Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this > >means for more precisely defining the nature of our future security > >needs. Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing > >external danger, the United States is actively examining new > >strategic options and choices. The variety of conceptual efforts > >underway in the Pentagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies > >this reality. (...) > > > >The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, and > >understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic > >policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. Clearly, the > >traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing > >the adversary's military capability is a fundamental and necessary > >component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent, however, is to field a > >range of capabilities to induce sufficient Shock and Awe to render > >the adversary impotent. This means that physical and psychological > >effects must be obtained. > > > >Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to control, on an > >immediate basis, the entire region of operational interest and the > >environment, broadly defined, in and around that area of interest. > >Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant battlefield awareness, > >we envisage Rapid Dominance producing a capability that can more > >effectively and efficiently achieve the stated political or military > >objectives underwriting the use of force by rendering the adversary > >completely impotent. > > > >In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly before > >an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies throughout > >the spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of > >battle and conflict resolution. > > > >"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary's > >will both physically and psychologically. Physical dominance includes > >the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize, and to render > >impotent. Psychological dominance means the ability to destroy, > >defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary to resist; or convince > >the adversary to accept our terms and aims short of using force. The > >target is the adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The > >principal mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing > >sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to convince > >or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. > >Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinformation, > >perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed. > > > >(...) > >Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance seeks > >to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the > >impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had > >on the Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance > >until both nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was > >sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average Japanese > >citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of > >Shock and Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the > >destructive power carried by a single airplane. This incomprehension > >produced a state of awe. > > > >(...) > >The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe must be > >compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the ability to > >"own" the dimension of time-moving more quickly than an opponent, > >operating within his decision cycle, and resolving conflict favorably > >in a short period of time. "Dominance" means the ability to control a > >situation totally. > > > >(...) > >Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the means > >to anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will involve the > >capability to deny an opponent things of critical value, and to > >convey the unmistakable message that unconditional compliance is the > >only available recourse. It will imply more than the direct > >application of force. It will mean the ability to control the > >environment and to master all levels of an opponent's activities to > >affect will, perception, and understanding. This could include means > >of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and > >other aspects of infrastructure as well as the denial of military > >responses. Deception, misinformation, and disinformation are key > >components in this assault on the will and understanding of the > >opponent. > > > > > >(...) > >Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the way > >in which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy, > >technology, and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It is this > >interaction and focus which we think will provide the most > >interesting results." > >usw. usw. > > > > > > > >------------------------------------------------------- > >rohrpost - deutschsprachige Liste zur Kultur digitaler Medien und Netze > >Archiv: http://www.nettime.org/rohrpost > http://post.openoffice.de/pipermail/rohrpost/ > >Ent/Subskribieren: > http://post.openoffice.de/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/rohrpost/ > > > ------------------------------------------------------- rohrpost - deutschsprachige Liste zur Kultur digitaler Medien und Netze Archiv: http://www.nettime.org/rohrpost http://post.openoffice.de/pipermail/rohrpost/ Ent/Subskribieren: http://post.openoffice.de/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/rohrpost/